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The rise and continued growth of electronic commerce has broadened the horizons of many 
businesses, spurred innovation, and fostered the development of new industries. Along with 
this growth emerges a new breed of criminal who seeks to compromise and monetize 
personal data at the expense of both the firm and the individual. Cybercrime has significant 
impacts to firms.  One way to measure the significance of cyber events such as data breaches 
to firm valuation is through the use of event studies, however the findings of previous event 
studies in this area have been mixed and are in need of additional research. Additionally, the 
effect of firm specific actions contained in the breach announcement, as well as the 
timeliness of the breach notification itself, have yet to be studied. Further, breach 
announcements are among myriad considerations evaluated by investors and may be less 
impactful to the firm during periods when investor distraction is high.  The current research 
applied four event study models to data breach announcements over the period 2018-2020, 
resulting in statistically significant negative cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in 
a variety of short and moderate term event windows centered on the breach announcement 
date, most notably the (-5,5) window.  A series of cross-sectional regression analyses noted 
that timely breach announcements were viewed favorably by investors, whereas a firm’s 
announced response to a breach had no significant impact on CAAR.  Investors generally 
reacted less negatively to breach announcements during periods of high investor distraction, 
however the results in this area were mixed and are in need of additional scholarly research. 
 Keywords:  data breach, event study, indirect cost, firm valuation, returns
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CHAPTER ONE — INTRODUCTION 
As firms increasingly leverage information technology in every aspect of their business, 
the customer data that they collect, store, transmit, and share continues to be a valuable 
commodity to hackers and organized crime groups who seek to illegally access and exploit this 
data for financial gain.  The likelihood that a firm will experience a data breach is significant and 
increasing.  According to Verizon (2019), there were 2,103 confirmed data breaches of firms in 
2018 and 41,686 confirmed security incidents.  Confirmed breaches increased significantly in 
2019 to 3,950 with 157,525 confirmed security incidents, rising 87.8% and 277.8% respectively 
(Bassett et al., 2020).  
Loss of customer data via data breach has significant consequences for breached firms, 
the most immediately impactful of which are the direct costs associated with the breach.  Direct 
costs refer to “unbudgeted, out of pocket spending” related to a breach, which includes costs 
associated with product or service discounts, client notifications, legal fees, administrative fees, 
call center expense, and investor relations (Tanimura & Wehrly, 2015).  According to The 
Ponemon Institute (2019), the direct costs to firms of data breaches are significant at $3.9 million 
per breach in 2019 (p. 18).  Direct costs may be related to the type of breach, which is dominated 





Malicious attacks were also the costliest breach type at an average of $4.45 million per breach in 
2018-2019 (Ponemon Institute, 2019, p. 6).    
Similar findings were noted in the 2020 Verizon Data Breach Report, which indicated 
that 70% of breaches in 2019 were perpetrated by external actors, 55% were conducted by 
organized criminal groups, and the majority of breaches (58%) involved loss of sensitive 
customer data (Bassett et al., 2020, p. 7).  Regarding attack vectors, the Verizon report noted that 
phishing and hacking (both defined as “the use of stolen credentials”) collectively accounted for 
40% of breaches in 2019 (p. 13).  
While previous research has attempted to measure breach-related costs using event 
studies to capture abnormal returns in the stock price of breached firms, the results have been 
mixed.  The event study methodology uses cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to statistically 
address the impact of an event on firm value.  Cumulative abnormal returns are a measurement 
of “the difference between the stock’s actual return at the event and its expected return” and are 
utilized in event studies to demonstrate the effect that an event may have on a firm’s stock price 
(Modi et al., 2015, p. 26).  When multiple stocks are evaluated for cumulative abnormal returns, 
the average of all CARs in the data set is the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR), 
which is an indicator of the impact of an event or events on the entire data set being evaluated. 
 For those that found negative CAAR post breach, there was significant variation in the 
amount of average negative CAR noted (Tanimura & Wehrly, 2015; Garg et al., 2003; Johnson 
et al., 2017; Michel et al., 2020).  Further complicating the calculation of post-breach costs to 
firms, numerous other studies have found no abnormal returns whatsoever (Das et al., 2012; 





subsets of data breaches within the same study (Campbell et al., 2003; Kannan et al., 2007; 
Yayla & Hu, 2011).  
There are many potential explanations for the variations in abnormal returns noted in 
previous research, as well as the mixed results overall.  Previous event studies have used several 
means of analysis, including the market model, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the 
Fama-French three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  As such, the 
methodology used may affect the results.  The current research aims to add clarity to the results 
by evaluating average CAR using all four models, and by utilizing the most contemporary data 
set in the research stream to date (2018-2020).  
Further, the current research adds value to the practitioner by testing the previous 
assertion that more contemporary data breaches are less impactful to firms simply because they 
are more commonplace.  The findings of the current research will allow firms to right size their 
response to data breaches by aligning the resources utilized in their breach response with the 
inherent risks as evidenced by the amount of cumulative abnormal returns.  Simply put, if 
modern investors place less emphasis on data breach announcements, or simply no longer care, 
firms should leverage this information as part of their breach response strategy.   
Contrary to Pirounias et al.’s (2014) finding that “Our outcomes, compared to other 
previous studies, suggest that investors have gradually become less sensitive to information 
related to security breaches and generally that the markets have matured relatively to the reaction 
to this kind of information,” the current research hypothesizes that there will be a negative CAR 
associated with data breaches involving loss of personal information (p. 13).  This hypothesis is 
based on a more narrowly focused research design which focuses on breaches involving the loss 





negative CARs for breaches specific to personally identifiable information consistent with the 
findings of Campbell et al. (2003) who found “a highly significant negative market reaction for 
information security breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential data, but no 
significant reaction when the breach does not involve confidential information” (p. 431).  The 
current research attempts to add value by replicating the findings of Campbell et al. (2003) using 
a larger and more contemporary data set focused on breaches that compromise personal 
information. 
Another area of focus in the current research is the potential for significant events 
unrelated to the firm or the breach announcement to confound investor reaction to data breach 
announcements.  In their analysis of breach announcements in the pre- and post-dot-com-bust 
eras, Kannan et al. (2007) found that “security breaches in the six months following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, and possibly related to the September 11 events, confounded the 
event study analysis” (p. 86).  While they cautioned other researchers that “This research 
highlights an important finding for event studies in general- namely, that the September 11 
terrorist attack may be regarded as a confounding event, and therefore the data around it should 
be handled accordingly,” the great majority of data breach related event studies that included 
breaches occurring in 2001 did not carve out this post-9/11 period as a confound, which 
potentially led to inconsistent research findings (p. 86).   
The current research aims to add originality and value by taking a more contemporary 
look at significant non-firm related events as a potential confound for event studies by 
hypothesizing that periods of high investor distraction may ameliorate negative abnormal returns.  
For example, the year 2020 may act as a confound due to the dominance of events such as 





periods in American politics.  Similar to Kannan et al.’s (2007) findings post-September 11th, the 
current research hypothesizes that investors prioritize their focus on significant events that 
dominate the news cycle and will be less likely to act on firm specific information. 
While previous research has focused on firm announcements of data breaches, there has 
been no evaluation of the content of the breach announcements, specifically any actions that the 
firm is announcing relative to the breach.  Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) included firm 
response as a variable in their model, however their response variable was dichotomous (whether 
the firm had a public response to the breach or not) and did not include the level of granularity 
regarding the firm’s response as the current research does.  However, their findings were 
promising as they noted generally that “we find a negative association between market reaction 
and firms that are less forthcoming about the details of the breach” (Gatzlaff & McCollough, 
2010, p. 61).  The current research aims to add originality and value by evaluating firm actions 
contained in breach announcements, answering a call for future research by Song et al. (2017) 
who noted that “little is known about the firm’s actions toward data breach incidents, and how 
investors react to firms’ actions” (p. 4957).  If firms couple breach announcements with positive 
news for investors and shareholders such as cooperation with law enforcement, free credit 
monitoring, or identity theft protection services, the current research hypothesizes that investors 
will be less punitive which will have a mitigating effect on negative returns. 
The timing of key events in the lifecycle of a data breach plays a critical role in the 
potential severity of the direct costs associated with the breach.  According to the Ponemon 
Institute (2019), for breaches occurring in 2019: 
The faster a data breach can be identified and contained, the lower the costs.  Breaches 





breaches with a lifecycle of more than 200 days ($3.34 million vs. $4.56 million 
respectively), a difference of 37 percent.  (p. 6) 
Further, they noted that the average time to identify a data breach was 206 days and the average 
time to contain a breach was 73 days (Ponemon Institute, 2019, p. 6).  While time may be of the 
essence in remediating a breach, the average number of days firms needed to identify and contain 
a breach continues to grow.  The number of days firms needed to identify and contain a breach 
have increased for the past three consecutive years, and increased by 4.9% in 2019 from the 
previous year (Ponemon Institute, 2019, p. 50).    
A few studies have identified the timeliness of a breach announcement as a variable, 
including Song et al. (2017), who found in part that “when data breach happens, firms not only 
should notify customers or the public timely, but also try to control the amount of information 
disclosed.” (p. 4957).  This finding is also consistent with the current hypothesis regarding the 
content of breach announcements.  The timeliness of breach announcements is also a matter of 
regulatory compliance for publicly traded firms, as 2018 U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) guidance cautioned firms that “Given the frequency, magnitude and cost of 
cybersecurity incidents, the Commission believes that it is critical that public companies take all 
required actions to inform investors about material cybersecurity risks and incidents in a timely 
fashion” (p. 4).  As such, firms that are viewed by investors as making untimely breach 
announcements may face indirect costs such as a negative impact on market valuation as 
investors may fear impending regulatory consequences.    
The timeliness of breach announcements has also been linked to consumer trust, as 
Muzatko and Bansal (2018) found that “companies that delay the announcement of a data breach 





disclose the data breach.” (p. 2).  While theirs was not an event study, they did find significant 
positive effects for timely breach announcements, noting that “companies that disclose the 
breach immediately upon its discovery may have an easier time repairing trust to the pre-breach 
levels.  Consumers might perceive the act of withholding the information as untrustworthy.” 
(Muzatko & Bansal, 2018, p. 7).    
 While the timing of post-breach announcements has been the subject of previous inquiry, 
the current research aims to add originality and value by evaluating the period between the 
occurrence of a breach and the related breach announcement.  This time period appears to have 
significance based on the Ponemon Institute’s (2019) data as well as discussions of the timing of 
specific breach related events in previous research.  The current hypothesis asserts that investor 
confidence in a firm will accrue based on a timely post-breach announcement and builds on the 
results of Song et al. (2017), who asserted in part that “although data breach announcements may 
lead to negative market reactions if a firm initiates the notification to their customers or the 
public early, the result could be different since this will add confidence to the investors due to 
timely disclosure.” (p. 4959).  While the ‘notification’ variable used by Song et al. (2017) was 
dichotomous (either the firm notified the public or someone else did), the current research will 
contribute to the existing body of knowledge by adding granularity to the announcement 
timeframe and further exploring any benefits to the firm that arise from prompt breach 
notification.    
The study of the timeliness and content of firms’ data breach notifications has 
applicability to several practitioner groups.  As the current research evaluates the indirect costs 
of data breaches using a narrow event window, the results should be of interest to cybersecurity 





evaluation of negative impact on market valuation may assist firms in justifying additional 
expenditures in data security or may indicate that additional data security costs are in excess of 
indirect breach related costs.  This business case is especially important to management, 
assuming that the firm exists solely to maximize shareholder value consistent with the agency 
theory of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Investors may benefit from the findings, as they 
may guide investors’ post-breach announcement actions based on their perception of the 
timeliness and content of the firm’s breach announcement.  Finally, firm ownership and Boards 
of Directors may benefit by evaluating the potential impact of direct post-breach costs to inform 
decision making regarding policies, procedures, expenditures, and management directives 
regarding data security and post-breach activities.    
This research intends to add value to the practitioner by more precisely quantifying the 
negative impact on market valuation due to the announcement of a data breach, which will allow 
firms to properly align their risk mitigation strategies accordingly.  Practitioners will also benefit 
from a clearer understanding of which mitigation strategies, such as offering free credit 
monitoring or ID theft protection, will be viewed more favorably by investors.  This research 
also intends to add value to scholars by furthering the body of knowledge in this area using a 
research design focused on announcements of data breaches where personally identifiable 
information was exposed.  Additionally, the research aims to add originality and value by 
assessing the effects of firm specific breach responses as well as the timeliness of the firm’s 
announcement.  Finally, the research aims to add value to all future event studies by attempting 
to identify 2020 as a confound due to the prevalence of other, more significant events that have 





Consistent with the hypotheses that will be later presented in Chapter 2, the research 
expects to find that the announcement of data breaches in which personally identifiable customer 
information was exposed will lead to negative abnormal returns.  The research also expects to 
find that expedient data breach announcements will be more favorably received by investors, 
which will ameliorate negative stock price impacts.  Additionally, it is expected that breach 
announcements containing specific remedies such as offering free credit monitoring or ID theft 
protection will also ameliorate negative stock price impacts.  Finally, consistent with Kannan et 
al. (2007), an analysis of breach announcements made in 2020 is expected to find that the 
severity of negative abnormal returns is lessened when occurring during periods during which 
investors are distracted by other, more significant news events. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  In Chapter 2, a literature 
review is conducted, and hypotheses are introduced based on identified gaps in the previous 
research.  In Chapter 3, the event study methodology is introduced and explained in detail. A 
discussion of the data points utilized in the research is also included.  In Chapter 4, the results of 
the analysis are discussed.  Chapter 5 includes concluding remarks, limitations, implications for 











CHAPTER 2 — LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been considerable scholarly interest in the topic of data breach announcements, 
beginning with Garg et al.’s (2003) seminal article which studied the effect of information 
security breaches on firm value, and found that the value of firms declined on average -2.7% on 
the day of the breach announcement and -4.5% over the three-day event window (0,2).  While 
this article represents the foundation of data breach related research, it also serves as a reference 
point for the significant variability in research methodology and the mixed results of the 
subsequent research in the stream.  Despite this variability, a key commonality among the extant 
literature is the theoretical underpinning of the research which relies on the efficient market 
theory (Fama, 1970).  
Variation in Event Windows 
The efficient market theory states that asset prices reflect all available information, and as 
such investors will react to any new information in the market (Fama, 1970).  Consistent with 
this viewpoint, the majority of the extant research has focused on direct breach costs and has 
used small event windows of between one and five days. This design captures immediate 
investor reactions to the announcement and limits the potential for confounding events in the 
event window.  The small event window also narrows the focus of the research to short term 





event windows, there was variability in the size and timing of the windows which appeared to 
contribute to the mixed results. Refer to Table 1 for a summary of event windows and key 
findings. 
Table 1 
Summary of Key Findings 






Campbell et al. (2003) 43 (1-,1) CAR -5.4% for a sub-sample of 11 
breaches involving confidential data.  
Cavusoglu et al. (2004) 66 (0), (0,1) AR of -.86% on event day (0), CAR      
-2.09% in the (0,1) window. 
Aytes et al. (2006) 67 (-2, 2) CAR -1.85% for a sub-sample of 36 
breaches involving confidential data.  
Goel & Shawky (2009) 168 Multiple event 
windows 
AR of -.35 on day (-1) and .48 on day  
(-2) 
Gatzlaff & 
McCullough (2010)  
77 (0,1) CAR of -.84%  
Bolster et al. (2010) 93 (-1,0), (-1, 1) 
and (1,30) 
CAR of -.56 in the (0,1) window for a 
sub-sample of 37 announcements made 
in major media outlets. No statistically 
significant findings using the entire 
sample. 
Yayla & Hu (2011)  123 (-1, 1), (-1,5),         
(-1, 10) 
CAR of -1.7% in the (-1,5) window.  
Pirounias et al. (2014) 105 (0, 0), (-1, 0),      
(0, 1), (-1, 1) 
No statistically significant findings. 
Tanimura & Wehrly 
(2015) 
152 (0,1) CAR of -.23% 
Rosati et al. (2019) 87 (0,1), (0,2), 
(0,3), (4, 10) 
CAR of -1.6% in the (0,1) window,       
-.8% in (0,2), 1% in (0, 3), and 3.7% in 
(4,10) 






In their study of how attack type (confidentiality, integrity, or access) affected average 
negative CAR associated with “internet security breaches,” which were defined broadly as “a 
malicious attempt to interfere with a company’s business and its information,” Cavusoglu et al.  
(2004) used a two-day event window beginning on the announcement date (0,1) and found an 
average CAR of -2.09% for the entire sample (p. 71).  Similar results were found by Gatzlaff and 
McCullough (2010) in their more narrowly defined study of data breaches in which employee or 
customer data was compromised, as they found an average negative CAR of -.84% over the 
same two-day event window (0,1).  In their research of breach announcements made on social 
media, Rosati et al. (2019) used a more contemporary data set of 2011-2014 and found an 
average CAR for the entire sample of -1.6% in the (0,1) window, declining to -.8% in the (0,2) 
window, and no negative CAR noted in the (0,3) window.  While Rosati et al.’s (2019) findings 
are consistent with the previous research using an event window beginning on the event date, 
they underscore the importance of using a narrow event window to capture abnormal returns, as 
their results indicated no abnormal returns in the three-day window following the breach 
announcement.  
Despite some consistency regarding average negative CAR for breach events in a narrow 
event window beginning on the event date, the overall results were mixed.  Pirounias et al. 
(2014) evaluated multiple one and two-day event windows, including (0,0) and (0,1) in their 
study of “security breaches” involving “data loss of any type” (p. 9).  They provided significant 
justification for their focus on narrow event windows, arguing that:  
the use of larger event windows is not a robust method to analyze the longevity of 
negative effects to the value of a firm, for two important reasons that accrue from the 





are contrary to the efficient market hypothesis.  Secondly, the more we move away from 
the event day, the higher the possibility of other random events influencing the market 
reactions is becoming.  (Pirounias et al., 2014, p. 6)  
This was consistent with the findings of no average negative CAR in the (0,3) window by Rosati 
et al. (2019).  However, Pirounias et al.’s (2014) results were inconsistent with similar research 
using narrow event windows beginning on the announcement date, as they found no abnormal 
returns in any of the event windows they studied.    
In their study of the reputational effects surrounding the loss of confidential information, 
Tanimura and Wehrly (2014) found no average negative CAR in the (0,1) window for data 
breaches involving customer data loss.  This was inconsistent with their hypothesis, as they note 
“The average abnormal return for data breaches involving direct customer data is -.09 percent, 
and is statistically insignificant- a surprising result, since customers can easily punish a firm with 
a poor reputation for protecting data” (p. 25).  Despite this finding, they did find an average 
negative CAR of -.23% in the (0,1) window for their entire data set, which included all data 
breaches where data loss occurred, whether by theft or accidental means. 
While these studies produced similar results, their event windows began on the date of 
announcement and as such had limitations when reviewed in the context of other research that 
used similar narrow event windows but did not begin on the event date.  There was a 
considerable body of research that included an event window beginning at least one day prior to 
the breach announcement in order to measure any potential information leakage prior to the 
announcement date.  This methodology is consistent with the efficient market theory, as any data 
that may be leaked to the market in advance of an official breach announcement would be acted 





date, the use of an event window beginning prior to the announcement also produced mixed 
results.  Campbell et al. (2003) was the first to utilize an event window beginning prior to the 
breach announcement date (-1,1), and found average negative CAR for breaches involving 
exposure of confidential information.  However, their research examined a now outdated data set 
of 1995-2000 and included a wide variety of events including distributed denial of service 
(DDoS), hacking, and e-mail related viruses, many of which are excluded from more 
contemporary data breach event study research.  
In their study of the intra-industry effects of data breaches, Aytes et al. (2006) expanded 
on Campbell et al.’s (2003) work by extending the data set to 2005 and increasing the event 
window to (-2,2) in order to account for any potential data leakage.  Their results supported 
Campbell et al.’s (2003) findings, as they noted an average CAR of -1.85% for breaches 
involving exposure of confidential data, but no negative CAR for breaches where no confidential 
data was exposed.  While their main hypothesis was supported and they found an average 
positive CAR of .79% for industry competitors, the sample size of both sub-groups they studied 
was small at 36 breaches with no confidential data loss and 31 breaches where confidential data 
loss occurred (Aytes et al., 2006,  p. 3305). 
In order to further explore the concept of potential pre-announcement data leakage, Goel 
and Shawky (2009) employed a large event window of (-119, 10) and evaluated abnormal 
returns (AR) for each day during the event window.  Their results were bolstered by the use of 
both the market model and the Fama-French three-factor model, which indicated a convergence 
on average negative CAR in the short-term pre-breach announcement window.  While the market 





return of -.35% on day -2 and -.48% on day -1 (Goel & Shawky, 2009).  Their findings appeared 
to support the presence of data leakage generally, as they found in part that: 
The average and cumulative abnormal returns were found to significantly decline in the 
one or two days prior to the event date.  While we would expect the decline to occur only 
after the incident, it was very likely that, significant information would be revealed to 
insiders and some impacted individuals, just prior to the public announcement.  (p. 405) 
Despite the consistent findings of negative AR on select days pre-announcement, the 
effect sizes appeared to be small and were significantly less than previous research using similar 
event windows (Campbell et al., 2003; Aytes et al., 2006).  As such, while Goel and Shawky 
(2009) appeared to bolster previous arguments for the importance of including pre-breach 
announcement dates in the short-term event window, their findings simultaneously cast some 
doubt regarding the impact of these dates on the overall erosion of firm value relative to a data 
breach announcement. 
Subsequent research by Bolster et al. (2010) cast additional doubt on the value of 
capturing pre-breach announcement dates in the event window, as their research found no 
average negative CAR in two narrow event windows (-1,0) and (-1,1).  However, their findings 
may have been impacted by the lack of a post-September 11th carve out, as their data set included 
the year 2001 and no carve-out was mentioned.  Similar findings were noted by Yayla and Hu 
(2011), who found no average negative CAR in the short term (-1,1) window, but did find an 
average negative CAR of -1.7% in their ‘moderate term’ six-day window of (-1,5).  Potentially 
contributing to their mixed findings, their research included a broad definition of breach 
categories which was not specific to customer data loss, and their sample included the year 2001 





methodology, their use of multiple event windows added value to the consideration of the event 
window to be studied, as they found in part that “there is a statistically significant negative stock 
market reaction to the announcements or news of firm-specific security breaches, and that this 
negative effect varies with the length of the event window” (Yayla & Hu, 2011, p. 69). 
 In order to shed additional light on the potential impact of data leakage pre-breach 
announcement, as well as to evaluate the timeliness of the market reaction consistent with the 
extant literature and the efficient market theory, the current research will utilize multiple breach 
event windows in order to capture investor reactions in both the short and moderate term 
scenarios.  This short and moderate term focus is consistent with calls for future research in this 
area, as Goel and Shawky (2009) noted “It is important to take a closer look at the behavior of 
the AR and CAR in the days immediately before and after an event date” (p. 407).  A moderate 
term focus may also be necessary to capture the full and complete investor reaction, which may 
take several days to unfold post-breach announcement.  This approach is consistent with the 
partial findings of Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) who caution that future research not be limited 
to only a short term window, as they note:  
The short window [-1,1] may be too short a window for investors to ascertain the full 
nature of the breach.  However, as the details start to emerge, investors truly understand 
the long-term impact of the breach.  The market then reacts rationally rather than 
displaying severe immediate ‘‘irrational antipathy’’ based on initial breach reports.  (p. 
53).  
By including moderate term windows, the current research attempts to capture a full 
market reaction to a breach announcement in addition to the immediate investor reaction in a 





fully react to a breach announcement.  Using multiple event windows has significant advantages, 
as it will support the research focus on negative impacts to firms’ market valuation, minimize the 
potential for confounding events in the event window, remain consistent with the efficient 
market theory, capture the full investor reaction, and identify any potential leakage of 
information prior to the actual breach announcement. 
Variation in Methodologies 
 In addition to the noted inconsistencies in the event windows chosen for data breach 
related event studies in the extant literature, there is also considerable variability in the 
methodologies that have been used to calculate average CAR.  A review of the literature 
regarding event study methodology as it pertains to data breach announcements has noted that 
this variability appears to also contribute to the mixed results.  Early event study research in this 
area utilized the market adjusted model, as well as a few studies using a matched pairs method.  
More contemporary research utilized the market model (also referred to in the extant literature as 
the capital asset pricing model or CAPM), as well as the Fama-French three-factor model, with 
the most recent research relying on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model consisting of the Fama-
French three-factor model as well as an additional factor for momentum.    
The evolution in both model methodology and the associated data sets over time led to 
mixed findings regarding abnormal returns, which presents an opportunity for future research in 
this area.  The Fama-French three factor model was initially utilized by Goel and Shawky in their 
2009 study focusing on breach type and severity, which yielded statistically significant results 
but only on select days near the breach announcement.  Further, their parallel use of both the 





may be more appropriate, as it led to more statistically significant results and more negative 
average CAR compared to the market model.  
Building upon this methodology, Gordon et al. (2011) used both the Fama-French three 
factor model and the market/CAPM model in their focus on the effect of breach announcements 
pre- and post-September 11th and noted that the Fama-French three factor model was the only 
one to yield statistically significant results regarding average negative CAR around the 
announcement date.  Using the Fama-French three-factor model they found an average negative 
CAR of -1.3% for all breach events over the period 1995-2007, while the market/CAPM model 
yielded no results of significance.  Based on their findings, they advocated for future research 
using the Fama-French model due to perceived deficiencies inherent in the market/CAPM 
model, which they argue was a contributor to the lack of consistent findings in previous data 
breach announcement research.  While their findings appeared to signify a paradigm shift in the 
event study methodology as applied to data breach related event studies, the literature review did 
not support such a shift, as various methodologies continued to be used after their findings were 
published. 
Building upon Gordon et al.’s (2011) research, Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) applied a 
four-factor model developed by Carhart (1997), which consisted of the Fama-French three-factor 
model plus an additional measure of momentum.  Applying the four-factor model to study data 
breaches of 93 firms from a customer service perspective, Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) found 
an average CAR of -.78% in the short term (-1, 1) window, and noted that average negative 
CARs were greater for larger firms as well as for breaches in which a greater number of records 
were compromised.  The four-factor model was by also used by Modi et al. (2015) who found 





breaches in service triads, which was largely consistent with Malhotra and Malhotra’s (2011) 
findings.  This appeared to be the only event study methodology that yielded consistent results, 
as subsequent research using the four-factor model found average CARs of -1.19% in the (-1, 3) 
window by Kammoun et al. (2019) and -2.02% in the pre-announcement window (-2,-1) by 
Michel et al. (2020).  The evolution of the event study methodology, and particularly the 
consistency of the four-factor model first employed in this research stream by Malhotra and 
Malhotra (2011) appears to present an avenue for future research.  The current research includes 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model due to the convergence in the previous literature which 
indicates that it consistently produces results statistically significant results.  However, 
researchers in the extant literature have found measures of success with all of the four main event 
study models, and as such these should be included for robustness of the current research.  The 
current research will further explore the effectiveness of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, 
Fama-French three-factor model, market/CAPM model, and the market adjusted model by 
applying them all to the same data set and evaluating the results of each.  This comparison will 
advance the discussion of model fit and usage in event studies by evaluating the output of all 
four major event study models. 
What Constitutes a Breach? 
In addition to variability in the length and timing of event windows, as well as the use of 
several different event study methodologies in previous research, there was also significant 
variation in the scope and definition of what constituted a data breach.  This variability regarding 
the definition of a breach appeared to contribute to the mixed results in the research stream.  The 
main differentiating factor for most studies was the type of information exposed in the breach, 






This difference was initially addressed in the seminal breach announcement related 
research of Garg et al. (2003), who found that breaches involving unauthorized access to 
“confidential data” were associated with an average negative CAR, but nothing significant was 
noted for breaches where confidential information was not compromised (p. 431).  However, 
their methodology may have contained potential confounds.  While their data set specifically 
excluded virus attacks, it included the year 2000 but did not carve out the distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks that occurred in February of that year.  These highly publicized attacks 
targeted eight large and well-known internet commerce sites over a four-day period, which could 
have easily confounded their overall findings as these incidents represented 36.3% of their 
overall sample size (n=22).  Due to the close proximity of these attacks to one another, the size 
of the organizations attacked, and the publicity of the attacks, the market may have reacted 
negatively to the DDoS attacks generally and not specific to an affected firm or firms.  Their data 
set also included the year 2001 but did not include a post-September 11th carve-out as later 
identified by Kannan et al. (2007).  As such, while Garg et al. (2003) appeared to have found 
differentiation in results between breaches that did and did not involve confidential data, the 
potential confounds in their methodology appeared to necessitate further research in this area. 
Early research in this area appeared to include definitional ambiguity and potential 
confounds consistent with Garg et al. (2003), including Campbell et al. (2003) who made a 
distinction between breaches that did or did not involve access to confidential information.  
However, their definition of “confidential information” was broad and included firm proprietary 
data as well as customer data (Campbell et al., 2003, p. 437).  They also included a broad scope 
of breaches, including DDoS attacks, hacking, and e-mail viruses.  While they did find an 





information and no results for all breaches, the sub-sample of breaches involving confidential 
information was small at only 11 events, as was their overall sample size of 43 events.  The small 
sample size, as well as the inclusion of DDoS attacks occurring in the year 2000 and no carve out 
for the February 2000 attacks may have confounded their results.  Despite these limitations, their 
findings did move forward the concept that not all breaches should be treated equally, as they 
noted that “all types of information security breaches are not viewed as having similar economic 
impacts” (p. 445). 
A somewhat standardized metric for classifying breaches by type was adopted early in 
the research stream by Cavusoglu et al. (2004), who categorized breaches according to the CIA 
framework (confidentiality, integrity, availability) in their research of the impacts of “internet 
security breaches” which they defined broadly as “a malicious attempt to interfere with a 
company’s business and its information” (p. 71).  While they did find an average CAR of -2.1% 
at a significance level of p <.05 for all breached firms in the (0, 2) event window, they noted no 
significant difference in breaches by type using the CIA classification.  They found in part that 
“the supposition that availability attacks have a different impact from other types of attacks was 
not supported by the data” and “This implies that markets do not distinguish between different 
types of security breaches” (pp. 88–90).   
However, their definition of the CIA classification method lacked specificity, their attack 
type variable was dichotomous (availability attacks versus all other attack classifications), and 
their events were heavily clustered during the years 2000 and 2001 which made them subject to a 
potential DDoS confound in February 2000 and the post-September 11th confound as noted by 
Kannan et al. (2007).  The presence of these potential confounds led to results that were contrary 





experience similar cumulative abnormal returns regardless of the nature of the attack is 
somewhat puzzling.  One possible explanation is that investors regard any kind of security 
breach as a failure of the IT security program and penalize firms for not having taken adequate 
steps to prevent security problems” (Cavusoglu et al., 2004, pp. 95–96).  These results were also 
contradictory to the findings of Garg et al. (2003) as well as subsequent research, indicating that 
a lack of a specific framework for categorizing breach events may have contributed to the mixed 
research results. 
  The CIA framework was more particularly defined by Kannan et al. (2007) who utilized 
this method to classify breaches by type in their study of the long-term impact of security 
breaches.  They utilized this framework to “classify attacks and understand how investor 
reactions differ with the type of attack.” (Kannen et al., 2007, p. 73).  The CIA framework 
classifies confidentiality as attacks that “compromise the confidentiality of a firm’s data assets, 
such as theft of credit card numbers, source code, or unauthorized access” and notes that 
“Breaches of this kind are probably targeted in that specific information is at risk.” (pp. 73, 74).  
Availability attacks are “Incidents leading to loss of availability of information assets” (p. 74).  
Integrity attacks “include viruses, worms, or any other security breach that compromises the 
integrity of the firm’s data and information assets.” (p. 74).  Using a matched pairs methodology, 
they found no average negative CAR in either the long or short-term windows once the post-
September 11th carve-out was applied, and also found no difference based on breach type using 
the CIA framework, consistent with the findings of Cavusoglu et al. (2004).    
In their study of the impact of data breaches in pre- versus post-September 11th, Gordon 
et al. (2011) applied the CIA framework and found that the type of breach impacted negative 





confidentiality, (ii) availability or (iii) integrity, attacks associated with breaches of availability 
are seen to have the greatest negative effect on stock market returns” (p. 33).  This was 
inconsistent with previous research by Cavusoglu et al. (2004), who also used the CIA 
framework and found no differences based on attack type.  Further, Gordon et al. (2011) found 
no results for the effect of “confidentiality” breaches on average negative CAR, which was 
inconsistent with other research in the stream that was focused on the compromise of 
confidential information (Garg et al., 2003; Campbell et al., 2003; Yayla & Hu, 2011).  
However, their methodology may have included some limitations that led to the conflicting 
results, most notably that their breach events included worms and viruses which tended to affect 
several firms simultaneously.  As such, there were clusters of data points around these 
worm/virus events, which may have acted as confounds similar to the February 2000 denial of 
service attacks.  Additionally, they note that worms and viruses led to the loss of availability.  
However, these breaches may have also led to the loss of confidentiality, or potentially both.  
There is some ambiguity regarding how worm and virus attacks were classified under the CIA 
framework, which may have affected the results.  
Applying the CIA methodology to a more contemporary data set (2010-2015), Amir et al. 
(2018) found no abnormal returns in both the (-1,3) and (-1,30) windows for firms who 
voluntarily reported a cyber-attack, an event which they defined as being similar to a data 
breach.  This finding is significant, as their data set did not include the potential confounds of 
previous research that utilized data points including February 2000 or post-September 11th, 2001.  
Further, their data set included mostly ‘confidentiality’ attacks (206 of the 276 incidents they 





conducted by Gordon et al. (2011) who also found no abnormal returns for confidentiality 
attacks. 
Using a similar data set (2011-2014) and the CIA breach classification methodology, 
Rosati et al. (2019) found an average CAR of -1.6% in a two-day event window (0,1) and -.8% 
in a three-day event window (0,2) in their evaluation of data breach announcements made via 
social media.  While these results were inconsistent with Amir et al.’s (2018) findings, the 
sample size used by Rosati et al. (2019) was much smaller at n=87, which may have affected the 
results.  Due to the inconsistent findings using contemporary data sets which excluded potential 
confounds inherent in earlier research, the CIA classification may not be sufficient to produce 
consistent results.  As such, a more precise definition of data breaches focused on the exposure 
of consumer personal information may be essential to guide future research in this area. 
Data breach research specific to consumer data also appeared to be hampered by 
inconsistent definitions, which contributed to mixed results.  In their narrowly focused study on 
the “exposure of personal information due to failures of some security mechanism,” Acquisti et 
al. (2006) defined a data breach as any instance “in which the data of consumers, employers, or 
third parties associated with a company traded on a public market was exposed” (pp. 1, 6).  
Despite the focus on personal information, their definition of a data breach which included the 
exposure of employer and third-party data appeared to be overly broad.  Further, these non-
consumer data points comprised 37.9% of their sample (n=79) and may have contributed to their 
finding of small effect sizes which were -.41% abnormal returns on the announcement date and   
-.58% CAAR over the two-day window (0, 1).  
The use of broad and inconsistent definitions of data breaches was pervasive in the 





Wehrly (2015) included theft or accidental loss of confidential information in their definition of 
a data breach and found a small effect size of -.23% average CAR in the (0,1) event window at a 
significance level of p <.05.  Similar results were noted by Johnson et al. (2017), who included 
computer hacking, data theft, and lost or stolen computer equipment in their definition of a data 
breach and found a small effect size of -.37% average negative CAR in the (-1,1) event window 
using a large sample size (n=467) and a contemporary data set of breach events over the period 
2005-2014.    
In contrast, Modi et al. (2015) focused more narrowly on “customer information security 
breaches” in their investigation of service failures in triads and found more significant average 
CARs between -.71% in the (-1,0) window and -1.38% in (-2,2) window (p. 21).  While their 
data set was more contemporary and their sample size was larger (n=146), the results of Modi et 
al. (2015) appear to demonstrate the value of a narrow definition of what constitutes a data 
breach, as it led to a significantly higher effect size as compared to similar previous research 
using a slightly broader data breach definition.    
Additional research focused on unauthorized data access produced mixed results.  For 
example, Ko and Dorantes (2006) focused on “unauthorized access to confidential data,” 
consistent with Campbell et al. (2003) and found no long-term impact of data breaches for up to 
four quarters post breach (p. 12).  However, their sample size was limited at n=19 and their data 
points spanned from 1997 to 2003 with no carve-out for post-September 11th or the February 
2000 DDoS attacks, both of which may have confounded the results of their matched pairs 
analysis.  
The findings of Ko and Dorantes (2006) were supported by similar research conducted 





short and long-term event windows.  Consistent with Ko and Dorantes (2006), they found no 
impact to firm valuations in the long term, however their long-term window was much shorter at 
(1,30).  Their findings of no abnormal returns in the short-term window were also inconsistent 
with Acquisti et al. (2006), who noted a small effect size in the same window (0,1).  These 
findings exacerbate the issue of what constitutes a data breach, as the literature has shown that 
findings are mixed despite research using similar definitions. 
In their research on the long-term effects of data security breaches, which they defined as 
“the disclosure of data compromises, including personally identifiable and credit card 
information,” Morse et al. (2011) noted average CAR of -4.08% in the one-year post-breach 
window and -6.74% in the two-year post-breach window, both at a significance level of p <.05.  
Their findings regarding long-term negative post-breach impacts were inconsistent with previous 
studies which found no abnormally negative results (Ko & Dorantes, 2006; Bolster et al., 2010).  
While they found in part that “the erosion of market value of a company suffering from a data 
breach lingers on and could dramatically impact its destiny despite the management’s abilities 
and intentions,” their research design appeared to be lacking in a few key areas (Morse et al., 
2011, p. 270). 
 Their estimation period of (-505,-251) was inconsistent with other research that used 
estimation periods ending shortly prior to the breach announcement date and was particularly 
problematic due to the likelihood of a potential confounding events occurring in the 251-day 
span between the end of the estimation period and the event date.  Further, there was no 
discussion of how confounding events were controlled for in their long-term event windows of 
(1,220) and (1,440).  While they did provide interesting findings regarding the source of the data 





punish more heavily those compromises that could have been avoided with reasonable 
precautions by the breached company,” their overall results appeared to be hampered by the 
likelihood of potential unidentified confounds in the pre- and post-event windows, which 
contributed to the mixed findings in this area (p. 263).    
Taking a broader approach to data breaches, Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011) studied events 
that they defined as “infringements that occur in the form of unauthorized access and use of 
computer services, purposeful interruption of computer services, theft or modification of 
computer codes, and destruction of data by computer viruses" (p. 1).  Using this broad definition 
of a data breach, they found average CAR of -1.5% in the (-1,1) event window, which was 
inconsistent with previous research that more narrowly focused on breaches exposing 
confidential data (Ko & Dorantes, 2006; Acquisti et al., 2006).  While they found abnormal 
returns, they discussed the potential that improper data classifications may have had in previous 
research, noting that “A possible reason for confounding results in the previous studies is that the 
security and privacy breaches were not clearly defined and separated” (Nicholas-Donald et al. 
(2011, p. 2).  Despite their findings, their methodology also had limitations as their sample size 
was small at n=30 and their data points did not include a carve-out for post-September 11th or the 
February 2000 DDoS attacks. 
More comprehensive research using a broad definition of “computer breaches” including 
“traditional hacks, negligence, phishing, and theft” was conducted by Michel et al. (2020, p. 
290).  The authors used a contemporary data set including breaches over the period 2005-2017 
and a large sample size of 344 events to study whether the method of breach announcement 
(mainstream media versus other sources) affected firm value and applied both the four-factor 





event windows surrounding the breach notification.  Their findings were unique among the 
research stream, as they found in part that “in the period prior to the announcement date in the 
media, the mean abnormal return is negative, reflecting a likely leakage of information.  In the 
period following the announcement date, the mean abnormal return is positive, often more than 
offsetting the previous declines” and that “in general, following the breach announcement, one is 
more likely to observe an increase rather than a decrease in the stock price" (pp. 288, 289).  This 
finding contrasts with all of the previous research in this area, however the research conducted 
by Michel et al. (2020) is among the most recent and the most inclusive.    
While they did find data leakage pre-announcement, which was consistent with previous 
research, their finding of positive average CAR post-breach was inconsistent with all previous 
breach related event study research.  This appeared to be attributed to their broad definition of 
what constituted a breach, as well as the post-breach event windows that produced positive 
average CAR, including 2.33% in the (1,20) window and 2.29% in the (2,20) window.  There 
was no other average positive CAR in any of the other windows they evaluated, and the average 
positive CAR that they did note were in a moderate term post-breach notification timeframe.  
Due to the length of the event window, other corporate or external events could have affected 
abnormal returns.  However, there was no discussion regarding whether these windows were 
evaluated for potential confounding events.  Despite the potential for unidentified confounds in 
the post-breach event windows, it appeared as though the overly broad definition of what 
constituted a computer breach may have been a contributing factor to their findings. 
While the use of the CIA framework was adopted by subsequent research in the stream 
and helped somewhat standardize the classification of breaches by type, there remain inherent 





broad and not specific to customer information.  In addition, the definitions of both the 
availability and integrity categories are subjective enough to allow for a potential 
mischaracterization of a breach involving customer data loss into either of these categories.  
Despite the use of a standardized breach classification framework, other research used different 
methods which further contributed to the mixed results in this area.  This was a noted limitation 
in the research stream, as Yayla and Hu (2011) noted that “the findings about the impact of 
security events on the market value of firms are inconclusive.  We submit that several 
methodological and data-related issues may have undermined the reliability of the results and 
contributed to the mixed findings” (p. 63).  In order to add value to the mixed results obtained 
using the CIA method, as well as other research that utilized different data classification 
methods, the current research utilizes a more narrow definition of breaches where customer 
information was exposed.    
A narrow definition of a data breach is adopted, as defined by the International 
Organization for Standardization (2014) as a “compromise of security that leads to the accidental 
or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to protected data 
transmitted, stored, or otherwise processed” (“terms and definitions” section 3.7).  In addition to 
constricting the scope of what constitutes a data breach, this definition is consistent with two 
previous data breach studies, both of which produced largely consistent results regarding average 
negative CAR.  In their study of the impact of repeated same-firm data breaches on firm value, 
Schatz and Bashroush (2016) used the International Standards Organization (ISO) definition of a 
data breach and found an average CAR of -1.27% for all disclosed breaches in the (-2,2) event 
window.  Similarly, in their study of the effects of corporate governance and social responsibility 





average CAR for all firms in the (-1,1) event window.  Due to the consistency of the findings 
between the two previous studies using the ISO definition, the current research aims to add value 
to the data breach research stream by demonstrating that the use of a uniform data breach 
definition is paramount to achieving consistent results. 
In addition to the narrow definition of a data breach, it is also essential to the focused 
nature of the current research that the type of data compromised be particularly described.  
Consistent with the ISO (2014) definition of a data breach, the current research will focus on 
breaches that expose the “protected data” of consumers.  While there are many variations on 
what types of data are protected, protected consumer data is often used synonymously and 
interchangeably with the terms “nonpublic personal information” (NPI) or “personally 
identifiable information” (PII).  These terms are routinely used in federal and state level 
legislation regarding consumer data privacy, and reference specific data such as “names, 
addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, income, credit score, and information 
obtained through Internet collection devices (i.e., cookies)” (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2016, p. 2).   
However, legislative definitions of NPI and PII appear to be intentionally vague as not to 
seem all-inclusive.  That notwithstanding, there are specific definitions of personally identifiable 
information in both the data security realm and in scholarly research.  According to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), personally identifiable information is defined as:  
any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual‘s identity, such as name, 
social security number, date and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric 





medical, educational, financial, and employment information. (McCallister et al., 2010, p. 
13)   
Scholarly research in the data security realm is consistent with the NIST definition but provides a 
more concise definition of personally identifiable information, with Krishanamurthy and Willis 
(2009) defining it as “information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity either alone or when combined with other information that is linkable to a specific 
individual” (p. 7).  As the scholarly definition of PII is consistent with the NIST definition, the 
current research will adopt the definition utilized by Krishanamurthy and Willis (2009) as this 
variable has been clearly defined and utilized in prior scholarly research. 
Variation in Data Sets 
Another potential contributor to the mixed results in the research stream is the reliance on 
secondary data, specifically the sourcing of this data from several different publicly available 
channels.  While early data breach research relied heavily on national newspaper reports, more 
contemporary research was divergent in the data sourcing approach and included online 
databases such as Lexis-Nexis, dedicated cyber/IT news websites such as C-Net, mainstream 
online news outlets, social media, and data compiled by online privacy “watchdogs” such as the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC).  Consistent with the narrow focus on data breaches 
involving the loss or exposure of personal information, the current research aims to add 
originality and value by sourcing data from the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC).  This 
non-profit organization collects breach and announcement data specific to breaches involving the 
loss or exposure of personal information.  
There are numerous advantages to using ITRC data.  While PRC data appears to be the 





integral to the current research.  For example, the ITRC data set includes fields for ‘date of 
breach’ and ‘date breach discovered,’ which will facilitate an analysis of the timing of data 
breaches as a variable in the current research.  The ITRC data is also consistent with the focus of 
the current research on protected data, as it includes fields for the number of ‘sensitive records 
exposed,’ while the PRC data set does not make this distinction.  The ITRC data also facilitates 
an evaluation of the effects of a firm specific response to a data breach by capturing data 
including whether or not identity theft protection was offered.  Finally, the ITRC data set 
captures more granular sector and industry data so that more robust cross-sectional regression 
analyses using these variables may be conducted.   
While there was only one previous study that utilized ITRC data, conducted by Modi et 
al. (2015), their results consistently identified average CAR in several event windows including -
.71% in (-1,0), -97% in (0,1), -1.17% in (-1,1) and -1.38% in (-2,2).  The current research aims to 
add originality and value by combining the narrow focus on breaches involving the loss or 
exposure of personal information using the ISO definition with data sourced from a leading 
consumer advocacy non-profit that is specifically focused on the loss or exposure of consumer 
information.    
There appears to be some convergence in the extant literature that more contemporary 
data breaches have had less of a negative impact on abnormal returns.  For example, in their 
research of pre- versus post-September 11th breach announcements, Gordon et al. (2011) found 
in part that: 
 in recent years average information security breaches have become less costly.  That is, 





breaches as creating a corporate “nuisance” (or merely another recurring operating cost) 
rather than creating a potentially serious economic threat to the survival of firms.  (p. 54) 
This apparent investor apathy was more pronounced in their post-September 11th data subset, as 
their results supported “the general argument that investors shifted their attitudes in the way they 
view information security breaches.  In essence, investors have grown accustomed to seeing 
news of a corporate information security breach without major consequences to the firm’s long-
term profitability" (Gordon et al., 2011, p. 51). 
Their position was echoed by other research in the stream, with Yayla and Hu (2011), 
finding in part that “security events occurred in recent years were found to have less significant 
impact than those occurred earlier, suggesting that investors may have become less sensitive to 
the security events” (p. 60).  Research using somewhat more contemporary data sets also reached 
similar conclusions, as Amir et al. (2018) found no abnormal returns for reported cyber security 
events using 2010 to 2015 data.  Similarly, Tweneboah-Kodua et al. (2018) used a data set of 
2013-2017 and found no abnormal returns in short term event windows.  However, they did find 
long term negative effects, noting overall that “the market does not significantly react to 
cyberattacks for all the event windows, except [-30,30]” (Tweneboah-Kodua et al., 2018, p. 639).    
Despite the apparent convergence in the research stream regarding the apparent lack of 
negative effects of contemporary breaches, the majority of the data sets that led to these findings 
excluded some of the largest breaches that have exposed the highest amount of customer data.   
According to CSO Online, the most contemporary breaches are also those that expose the most 
customer data, with all 15 of the largest breaches in the 21st century from a records 
compromised standpoint occurring from 2012 to present (Hill & Swinhoe, 2021).  However, 





as there have only been several event studies including data from 2012 or more recent (Das et al., 
2012; Schatz & Bashroush, 2016; Rosati et al., 2017; Rosati et al., 2019; Kammoun et al., 2019; 
Michel et al., 2020; Song et al., 2017; Tweneboah-Kodua et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2017; 
Pirounias et al., 2014).   
The current research will add value by utilizing the most contemporary data set to date.  
The inclusion of breaches where the highest number of customer records is exposed is significant 
due to the positive correlation between number of records breached and average negative CAR 
as noted in previous research (Johnson et al., 2017; Michel et al., 2020; Tanimura & Wehrly, 
2015).  This evaluation also has implications for management and cybersecurity professionals, as 
larger breaches may lead to disproportionately higher risk consequences for the firm.  Based on 
the findings of previous event studies that focused on breaches of personal identifying 
information, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: Announcements for data breaches where personally identifying 
information has been compromised will lead to negative abnormal stock 
price reaction. 
Timing of Data Breach Announcements 
While considerable research has been conducted on the overall effects of data breach 
announcements, the relationship between the timing of a breach announcement and abnormal 
returns has only been tangentially investigated.  This is an important area for future research, as 
it may provide valuable insight into the motivations of investors as they respond to breach 
announcements.  It is possible that investors may punish firms who delay disclosure more so than 
firms who notify investors promptly of data breaches.  Similarly, investors may take a negative 





announcement more so than a firm who announces a breach promptly.  Investors may infer the 
potential severity of a breach based on the timeliness of the announcement, which may adversely 
affect firms who delay announcements.  Any of these differences in the timing of a breach 
announcement may lead to disproportionate investor reaction, which may in turn have significant 
consequences for firms.  The current research adds originality and value by evaluating breach 
notification timing at a more granular level than has been previously studied in the research 
stream.      
Previous research has only marginally studied the effects of breach notification timing, 
however there are indications that the timing of a breach announcement does affect the reaction 
of investors.  For example, in their longitudinal stakeholder analysis of the 2005 TJX Companies 
cyberattack and related firm response, Hovav and Gray (2014) were the first to discuss breach 
notification timing, noting that “the value of the stolen information is likely to diminish over 
time, and so is the impact of the attack until there is another event (or news) relevant to the initial 
attack” (p. 896).  This finding laid the foundation for the consumer and investor implications of 
the timeliness of a breach announcement.  However, their research was not specific to breach 
announcement timeliness and was not an event study.    
In their investigation of disclosing vs. non-disclosing firms, Amir et al. (2018) found a 
significant difference between firms who disclosed data breaches and those who did not, stating 
that “we distinguish between cyber-attacks that were voluntarily disclosed and those that were 
withheld from investors and later independently discovered, and we find that, in the latter cases, 
the market reaction is negative and significant” (p. 1179).  They further noted that the 
consequences of non-disclosure may not be short lived, stating that “the stock price decrease in 





investors.  The negative reaction to withholding information is not temporary; it persists long 
after the discovery of the cyber-attack” (p. 1192).    
In their study of breach notifications and consumer trust, Muzatko and Bansal (2018) 
found that delayed breach announcements were negatively related to consumer trust, finding in 
part that “companies that delay the announcement of a data breach are likely to suffer a larger 
drop in consumer trust than those companies that immediately disclose the data breach.” (p. 2).   
Conversely, they found that prompt breach notification was positively related to trust, and gave 
insight into the consumer psyche, noting that “companies that disclose the breach immediately 
upon its discovery may have an easier time repairing trust to the pre-breach levels.  Consumers 
might perceive the act of withholding the information as untrustworthy” (Muzatko & Bansal, 
2018, p. 7).  However, while their findings were insightful, their research was not an event study 
and therefore did not evaluate the impact of consumer trust on abnormal returns. 
Despite the findings of previous research, there was no direct assessment of the 
timeliness of the breach announcement and the related impact on stock price.  The current 
research adds originality and value in this area by evaluating breach announcement timeliness, 
specifically the span of time between the breach occurrence and the related announcement, 
hypothesizing that: 
H2: The longer the length of time between the occurrence of a breach 
involving personally identifying information and the associated breach 
announcement, the more negative abnormal stock price reaction will be. 
Firm Specific Breach Response 
In addition to the perception of timeliness of a breach announcement, investors may also 





research has identified the importance of firm actions post-breach announcement, none have 
specifically evaluated the impacts of specific actions contained in the breach announcement and 
their effect on abnormal returns.  This research aims to add originality and value by evaluating 
breach announcements containing firm and consumer specific remedies and determining whether 
the inclusion of a specific remedy such as the provision of free consumer credit monitoring of 
firm cooperation with law enforcement have an effect on abnormal returns. 
Previous research has evaluated firms’ post-breach announcement actions in context of 
service failures.  In their analysis of post-breach announcement effects from a marketing 
perspective, Martin et al. (2017) noted that the study of data breach related effects from a 
customer standpoint were lacking, stating that “Most research into data breach vulnerability 
narrowly emphasizes firm characteristics (e.g., industry, firm size, past breach), ignoring the 
customer’s central role in driving performance outcomes or mitigation strategies” (p. 43).  
Underpinned by the gossip theory, their research evaluated negative post-breach announcement 
effects of breached firms as well as their nearest rival firms and found average negative CAR in 
short term windows for both breached firms as well as their competitors.  They found in part that 
the consumer’s perception of the firm was a significant driver of negative post-breach outcomes, 
noting that “The detrimental impact of a data breach on firms likely results from the anticipation 
of negative customer responses and the perception of insufficient data protection by the firm.  
These forces combine to damage firm performance, as reflected in its abnormal stock returns.” 
(p. 43).  They recommended that future research into a firm’s specific breach response be 
conducted, stating that “further research might address how firms make amends or restore 
benevolent aspects of their customer relationships following vulnerability-inducing events” (p. 





In their research on data breaches as service failures, Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) also 
emphasized the importance of evaluating the firm’s recovery efforts, noting that “Future research 
studies are needed to further explore customer information security breach incidents in the 
context of service failures and recovery” (p. 54).  They also called for a more specific analysis of 
the firm’s post-breach response, stating that “Researchers may also want to look at the specific 
recovery efforts of firms suffering the breach … and the consequent impact on customers’ 
perception of breached firms” (p. 54).  The focus on tangible post-breach responses by firms was 
echoed by Modi et al. (2015), who stated that “for recovery to be effective in tempering the loss 
in customer relationships, post-failure efforts by firms need to focus on providing tangible and 
intangible restitutions to customers that are commensurate with their perceived loss” (p. 22).   
Based on the repeated calls for an evaluation of the impacts of specific firm responses to a 
breach, and consistent with previous research focused on data breaches as service failures, the 
current research hypothesizes that: 
H3a: Announcements containing customer-specific remedies (such as free 
credit monitoring) will decrease the negative stock price reaction to data 
breaches involving personally identifying information. 
H3b: Announcements that acknowledge a firm-specific response (such as 
cooperation with law enforcement) will decrease the negative stock price 
reaction to data breaches involving personally identifying information. 
Exploring 2020 as a Confound 
The identification of potential confounding events appeared to be somewhat lacking in 
the data breach research stream.  This was evident in the findings of previous data breach related 





carve-out, which yielded mixed results ranging from no long-term breach impact (Ko & 
Dorantes, 2006), to no short-term negative impact (Das et al., 2012), to a very minimal amount 
of average CAR of -.28% (Morse et al., 2011), to a significant average CAR of -4.5% (Garg et 
al., 2003).  While this significant variation in findings may be attributed to several other factors 
such as event window size, type of breach, sample size, and the type of event study methodology 
used, it appeared that the presence of a confound may have affected the results, consistent with 
the findings of Kannan et al. (2007).  
The current research aims to add originality and value by building on the finding of a 
post-September 11th confound as identified by Kannan et al. (2007) by applying their logic to 
current events using a contemporary data set.  Similar to the dominance of September 11th in the 
news cycle for several months after the event, there have been a few significant events in 2020 
that may have monopolized the attention of investors.  Events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, 
civil unrest, and an unprecedented polarizing political climate in an election year have dominated 
the headlines.  This may have shifted investor focus away from firm specific events such as data 
breaches.  Consistent with the September 11th confound identified by Kannan et al. (2007), we 
believe that the significant events of 2020 will confound event studies of data breaches, and 
hypothesize that: 
H4: Investor distraction is negatively correlated with abnormal stock price 
reaction, such that negative cumulative abnormal returns following a data 
breach announcement will be less severe during periods of high market 
distraction. 














































CHAPTER 3 — DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
This research utilizes four event study methodologies (market adjusted model, market 
model, Fama-French three-factor model, and Carhart four-factor model) to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) based on a sample of 
data breach announcements reported by publicly traded companies.  As described in detail in 
Table 2, a total of 4650 records including data breach announcement dates, breach 
announcements, and other firm specific data (sector, industry, number of consumer data records 
compromised, etc.) were provided by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) spanning the 
three-year period of 2018 to 2020.  To prepare the raw data for CAAR and regression analyses, 
several steps were taken.  As the raw data included all reported data breaches, analysis was 
conducted using industry and sector codes to exclude non-publicly traded firms (for example: 
education, government, non-profit, hospital), as well as hand coding by the researcher using 
FactSet data to determine whether or not each breach occurred at a publicly traded firm. This 
process excluded 4294 records.  Duplicate entries were then removed, excluding 26 records.  
Breaches occurring prior to a firm’s initial stock trading date or within 250 days of the initial 
trading day of the firm’s stock were removed, excluding 19 records.  In order to avoid potential 





12 records were excluded due to multiple breaches of the same firm within a single event 
window.  A review of the announcement of each breach was conducted, with 81 records 
removed that were not consistent with the definition of a ‘data breach’ as used in the current 
research.  One record was removed due to apparent errors within the provided data (inaccurate 
breach announcement date based on a review of the provided breach announcement), which 
resulted in a final data set of 217 records of all data breaches during the three-year period under 
investigation.  For comparison purposes, an additional data set was created by removing 28 
breaches that did not fit the definition of “personally identifiable information” as noted by 
Krishanamurthy and Willis (2009), resulting in a final data set of breach announcements of 
publicly identifiable information of 189 records.     
Table 2 
 
Sample Selection Process 
 
Selection Criteria Number of Records 
Total number of breach announcements from 
ITRC database (2018-2020). 
4650 
Removed breaches at non-public companies. (4294) 
Removed breaches that occurred prior to the 
company going public, or within the 250-day 
estimation period. 
(19) 
Removed duplicate entries. (26) 
Removed breaches that did not fit the 
definition of a “data breach” as defined in the 
current research (ISO, 2014). 
(81) 
Removed breaches where the breach 
announcement occurred within the event date 









Sample Selection Process 
 
Selection Criteria Number of Records 
Removed an improperly coded item. (1) 
Final sample- all reported breaches 217 
Removed all breaches that did not fit the 
definition of “personally identifiable 
information” as defined in the current 
research (Krishanamurthy & Willis, 2009). 
(28) 
Final sample- all breaches exposing PII. 189 
Note: Records provided by the ITRC spanning the three-year period 
2018 to 2020. 
Hand coding of additional variables was then conducted using several data sources.  
FactSet data was queried to determine the age of each firm using their recorded initial traded date 
and the current market capitalization.  While these were not hypothesized data points, this data 
was captured for inclusion in regression analyses to improve potential model fit.  Due to 
limitations in FactSet regarding firm age, which was only available as of January 21, 1972, 
additional internet research was conducted for firms with this date listed as their initial trading 
date.  If an earlier date was found via internet research, it was substituted for the FactSet initial 
trading date due to the identified limitation.  
In order to prevent potential confounds in the CAAR analysis, breach announcement 
dates were then reviewed to determine the day of the week reported.  Breach announcement 
dates that occurred on a non-trading day (Saturday, Sunday, or U.S. Federal holiday) were 
adjusted to reflect the next regular trading day.  To further limit potential confounds, FactSet was 





specific news items that were included as potential confounds included announcements of 
quarterly earnings, dividends, mergers/acquisitions, analyst upgrades, and analyst downgrades.  
Details regarding the removal of confounding events prior to the CAAR analysis is described in 
Table 3 and Table 4 below. 
Table 3  
 
Removal of Confounding Events for CAAR Analysis 
 
 All Breach Announcements PII Breach Announcements Only 
Event 
Window 
(-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) 




(20) (45) (64) (108) (16) (49) (54) (90) 
 
Final n= 197 172 153 109 173 150 135 99 




Confounds Removed for CAAR Analysis- by Type 
 
Confound Type # of Exclusions –  
All Breaches 
# of Exclusions – 
PII Breaches Only 
Earnings Announcement 43 35 
Dividend Announcement 12 10 
Merger/Acquisition Announcement 14 14 
Analyst Upgrade 10 6 
Analyst Downgrade 21 18 
Other 5 4 
Note: “Other” confound events included key management/ Board member departures, 






In order to test H2, a variable identifying the gap between when a breach was discovered 
by a firm and when the breach was announced was calculated, as well as a similar variable 
identifying the gap between when a breach occurred and the associated breach announcement.  
In order to test H3a and H3b, breach announcements were reviewed, and data points were 
created for announcements mentioning cooperation with law enforcement, involvement of an 
external computer forensics firm, and the provision of ID theft protection and/or credit 
monitoring to those affected by the breach.  While not initially hypothesized, information 
regarding the length of ID theft protection and/or credit monitoring services being offered was 
also collected for inclusion in regression analyses.  In order to test H4, the volatility index (VIX) 
as of the close of business was hand coded for each breach announcement date using FactSet 
data. 
Methodology 
In order to assess the impact of a data breach announcement on the stock price of a 
breached firm, an event study methodology was utilized to calculate CAR for each breached firm 
in three event windows, (-1,1), (-5,5), and (-10,10).  Firm specific abnormal returns were then 
aggregated to determine the CAAR for all breached firms.  A series of regression analyses were 
conducted to test the hypotheses identified in the previous section.  In management research, 
event studies are the generally accepted means of evaluating the impact of how an unanticipated 
event or information affects stock prices (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  As the current research 
aims to assess the effect of data breach events on firm valuation, an event study is the appropriate 
methodology to test the hypotheses by evaluating the extent to which data breach announcements 





An event study is a process that generally consists of several component parts, which 
include establishing an event window, calculating the expected return of a stock using an 
estimation period, and then determining the abnormal return by comparing the expected return of 
the stock against the actual return during the event window (MacKinlay, 1997).  While event 
studies began as a rudimentary calculation of a stock’s actual return against a broader market 
index, the methodology has grown in complexity since the market adjusted model was first used 
to examine stock splits by Dolley in 1933.   
The market adjusted model is simplistic and contains no estimation period in order to 
calculate the expected return of a security.  However, the three additional models used in this 
research calculate expected returns by applying one or more factors to the performance of each 
security during the predefined estimation period of 250 trading days.  The single factor model 
calculates a stock’s expected return by evaluating sensitivity to market risk (β) during the 
estimation period and applying the output to the event window.  The Fama-French three-factor 
model adds two additional factors of firm size and book-to-market ratio to the β factor, and the 
Carhart model adds a fourth factor of momentum to the expected return calculation.  Once the 
expected return is calculated, the abnormal return for each security is then determined by 
calculating the difference between the actual return and the expected return as identified via each 
model.  The evolution of these models and the predictive value of the factors included within 
each are detailed later in this section, following a discussion of the theoretical underpinning of 
event studies in general.  
The theoretical underpinning for event studies is the efficient markets theory, which 
states that market prices always fully reflect all available information (Fama, 1970).  The 





prices which originated with the random walk theory offered by Bachelier (1900) and was first 
empirically tested by Kendall and Hill (1953).  This theory states that speculation on the return 
of a given stock based solely on previous performance should not yield any returns above zero to 
the speculative investor.   
Fama (1970) notes empirical support for the random walk theory, citing previous 
research by Alexander (1961) and Fama and Blume (1966) in which various filters were applied 
to buy/sell strategies based on percentage gains and losses of a stock over a period of time.  In 
both cases, these filters could not beat a buy/hold strategy.  This led Fama (1970) to note that 
“the conclusion that the filters cannot beat buy-and-hold is support for the efficient markets 
hypothesis” (p. 395), and overall, that “the weight of the empirical evidence is such that 
economists would generally agree that whatever dependence exists in series of historical returns 
cannot be used to make profitable predictions of the future” (p. 399).   
Fama (1970) provides empirical support for the efficient markets theory, citing Ball and 
Brown’s (1968) research into the effects of earnings announcements on stock price and Scholes’ 
(1969) study of secondary offerings of common stock and new stock issues.  Both studies noted 
abnormal returns based on the public announcement of firm specific events.  Based on the 
empirical support for efficient markets, Fama (1970) concluded in part that “the evidence in 
support of the efficient markets model is extensive and (somewhat uniquely in economics) 
contradictory evidence is sparse” (p. 416). 
Despite the empirical support for the efficient markets theory, Fama (1970) notes a few 
limitations inherent in the flow of new information to investors and their collective response to 
that information.  He discusses the potential real-world hurdles to markets “fully reflecting” all 





noting that “a frictionless market in which all information is freely available and investors agree 
in its implications is, of course, not descriptive of markets met in practice” (p. 387).  He 
discusses the effects of market friction on the efficient markets theory and notes that not all 
investors may be privy to all information, stating:  
though transaction costs, information that is not freely available to all investors, and 
disagreement among investors about the implications of given information are not 
necessarily sources of market inefficiency, they are potential sources.  And all three exist 
to some extent in real world markets.  Measuring their effects on the process of price 
formation is, of course, the major goal of empirical work in this area.  (p. 388) 
In order to account for these potential sources of market friction, Fama (1970) provides 
three tests of market efficiency which add granularity to the efficient markets theory.  Weak form 
tests look to past price to predict future returns, consistent with random walk theory.  Semi-
strong form tests evaluate the speed of price adjustments based on publicly available 
information.  Strong form tests determine whether any investor or group has a monopoly on any 
information relative to the formation of a stock's price.  The current research is partially 
underpinned by the semi-strong and strong form tests of the efficient markets theory, as it will 
evaluate both the speed of price adjustments as well as whether any data leakage occurred prior 
to the breach announcement.   
Market adjusted model.  The market adjusted model is the most simplistic of the four 
models utilized in the current research and was used extensively in the formative years of event 
study research.  This model calculates abnormal returns by evaluating the daily return of a stock 
against the return of the broader market.  To calculate market adjusted returns:  





Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on security i over period t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return on an identified market 
index over period t. 
The market adjusted model was among four methodologies tested by Brown and Warner 
(1980), who noted that “the variable of interest is the difference between the return on a sample 
security and the corresponding return on the market index” (p. 213).  They further discuss the 
simplicity of this model in context of the other models that they evaluated, noting that the market 
adjusted model “assumes that ex ante expected returns are equal across securities, but not 
necessarily constant for a given security” (p. 208).  This was problematic according to Brown 
and Warner (1980), as this methodology did not account for the risk profile of the security being 
analyzed.   
However, their analysis of the four different models also found in part that “a simple 
methodology based on the market model performs well under a wide variety of conditions. In 
some situations, even simpler methods which do not explicitly adjust for market wide factors or 
for risk perform no worse than the market model” (Brown & Warner, 1980, p. 201).  While this 
model may be viewed contemporarily as simplistic, it is included in the current analysis so that 
its output may be compared against the other more complex models and based on the evaluation 
of this model’s performance in certain situations compared against more complex models as 
noted by Brown and Warner (1980). 
Single factor market model.  As further empirical support of the efficient markets 
theory, Fama (1970) presents the results of an event study conducted by Fama et al. (1969) 
evaluating the impact of the announcement of stock splits on stock prices.  They found that stock 
split announcements produced abnormal returns, consistent with the semi-strong form test of 





model, in which Fama et al. (1969) used a model initially developed by Markowitz (1959) in 
order to calculate a stock’s expected returns: 
𝑟 ?̃?,𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑟 ̃𝑀,𝑡+1 + 𝑢 ?̃?,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟 ?̃?,𝑡+1 is the rate of return on a security j for month t+1, 𝑟 ̃𝑀,𝑡+1 is the corresponding return 
on a market index M, 𝑎𝑗 and 𝛽𝑗 are parameters that can vary from security to security and 𝑢 ?̃?,𝑡+1 
is a random disturbance (Markowitz, 1959).   
Once expected returns were calculated, Fama et al. (1969) then calculated the cumulative 
average residual using the formula: 




where 𝑈𝑚 is the cumulative average residual, m is the month relative to the split month, k is the 
number of months evaluated prior to the split month (estimation period), and u is the calculated 
deviation per security (Fama et al., 1969).  Using this methodology, they found an abnormal 
increase in stock prices prior to the split month, which they argue is proof of the efficient market.  
The authors attributed the abnormal returns to the investors’ belief that a split would be 
accompanied by an increase in dividend.  Investors acted on this market signal by purchasing 
stocks prior to the split month, which led to an abnormal increase in the price of the securities.  
Consistent with the semi-strong form test of market efficiency, they found in part that “the data 
present important evidence on the speed of adjustment of market prices to new information,” 
however the “speed of adjustment” to which they refer was measured in months and not days 
(Fama et al., 1969, p. 17). 
In an effort to more effectively capture the speed of the market adjustment to new 





(1969) to capture and evaluate daily variance in stock returns.  Brown and Warner (1985) also 
furthered their own contributions first published in their 1980 research by applying the following 
procedure to determine excess daily stock returns. 
Mean adjusted returns: 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 
Where 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the excess return for security i at day t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the observed arithmetic return for 
security i at day t, and ?̅?𝑖 is the sample average of security i’s daily returns in the estimation 
period. 
While the securities they tested were selected at random and the event dates they used 
were hypothetical, they did find abnormal returns in a much shorter window of 11 days (-5,5).  
They found in part that “There is evidence of substantial increases in the variance of a security’s 
return for the days around some types of events” (Brown & Warner, 1985, p. 22).  Despite their 
finding that the use of daily stock return data was more volatile than monthly data, they found 
overall that “the characteristics of daily data generally present few difficulties in the context of 
event study methodologies” (p. 25).  However, their major contribution was to move the event 
study methodology forward with the use of daily data.  In a more contemporary analysis of the 
evolution of the event study methodology, Binder (1998) further supported the use of daily 
returns and bolstered Brown and Warner’s (1985) findings, noting that “event studies with daily 
returns perform at least as well in practice as those with monthly returns,” and that “the potential 
problems with daily returns are unimportant or easily corrected in the standard event study and, 
when the event date is known, tests with daily data have a greater signal to noise ratio than those 





While Fama (1970) and Brown and Warner (1985) offered improvements over the 
simplistic market adjusted model, the association between the risk of a security and abnormal 
returns had yet to be addressed.  The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was initially theorized 
by Sharpe (1964) and introduced risk as a measure of asset prices, with the theorized model 
evaluating the relationship between an asset’s risk and expected return.  Sharpe (1964) argued 
that the inclusion of risk in the theorized CAPM “sheds considerable light on the relationship 
between the price of an asset and the various components of its overall risk” (p. 427).  He further 
differentiated between unexpected return on a stock stemming from systematic risk (market risk) 
as well as unsystematic risk (the risk characteristics of an individual investment).  
Building on his theoretical contribution, Sharpe (1970) included a component of risk in 
the seminal CAPM equation.  This equation was further detailed by Black (1972) as: 
𝐸(?̃?𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(?̃?𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] 
where ?̃?𝑖 is the return on asset i for the period and is equal to the change in the price of the asset, 
plus any dividends, interest, or other distributions, divided by the price of the asset at the start of 
the period; ?̃?𝑚 is the return on the market portfolio of all assets taken together; 𝑅𝑓 is the return 
on a riskless asset for the period; 𝛽𝑖 is the “market sensitivity” of asset i and is equal to the slope 
of the regression line relating ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑚. 
Despite the inclusion of risk as a factor in evaluating abnormal stock returns, there was 
little early empirical support for Sharpe’s (1970) CAPM.  Early testing using this model found 
limited support for its predictive power, as Black (1972) noted “several recent studies have 
suggested that the returns on securities do not behave as the simple capital asset pricing model … 





noting that riskier stocks with higher β actually performed more poorly than stocks with lower β 
(Pratt, 1967; Friend & Blume, 1970; Jensen et al., 1972).   
Due to the perceived limitations of Sharpe’s (1970) CAPM, there were repeated calls for 
additional research and revisions to the model in order to address the correlations noted between 
risk and β and to increase the predictive power of the model.  Black (1972) responded to the calls 
for revisions to the model and revised the CAPM to exclude the “riskless asset” and “riskless 
borrowing” concepts included in the original model.  In response, Black’s (1972) revised CAPM 
assumed that “there is no riskless asset and that no borrowing or lending at the riskless rate of 
interest is allowed” (p. 446).  With these components of the original CAPM removed, Black 
(1972) found in part that “the expected return on any risky asset is a linear function of its β” (p. 
455), as represented by (p. 450): 
𝐸(?̃?𝑖) =  𝐸(?̃?𝑧) +  𝛽𝑖[𝐸(?̃?𝑚) −  𝐸(?̃?𝑧)] 
where ?̃?𝑧 is the return on a portfolio with 𝛽 = 0. 
The improvements to the CAPM by Black (1972) led to a more predictive single factor 
model.  As such, a single factor model that includes a measure of risk is included in the current 
analysis.  Further, Brown and Warner (1980) noted that “Our finding that the test methods are 
not always consistent when there is abnormal performance opens up the possibility that there are 
sets of methodologies which, when used jointly, are more likely to detect abnormal performance 
than any one method alone.” (p. 246).  The current research acknowledges this finding and 
utilizes multiple models in order to control for any inherent deficiencies in a single model. 
Fama and French three-factor model.  Despite the finding by Brown and Warner 
(1980) that “beyond a simple, one factor market model, there is no evidence that more 





three-factor model which included size (market equity-ME) and book-to-market equity (ratio of 
book value of common equity to market value) in addition to market risk as an alternative to the 
single factor market model.  Their empirical research using the CAPM illustrated the need for a 
more contemporary model, as they found that the CAPM demonstrated predictive value when 
applied to stock performance in earlier periods (1926-1968), but not when applied to more 
contemporary stock performance (1963-1990) (p. 449).  Their evaluation of potential factors to 
add to a predictive model found cross-sectional relations between both size and book-to-market 
equity and average returns, which led to their inclusion in the model.   
While Fama and French (1992) supported their multi-factor model by noting that “If 
assets are priced rationally, our results suggest that stock risks are multidimensional” their 1992 
publication did not include any empirical testing of the proposed model (p. 428).  One year after 
their development of the three-factor model, Fama and French (1993) conducted empirical 
testing of the model using time series regression and found support, concluding in part that “For 
stocks, portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to size and BE/ME capture strong 
common variation in returns, no matter what else is in the time-series regressions.  This is 
evidence that size and book-to-market equity indeed proxy for sensitivity to common risk factors 
in stock returns” (p. 5).  Their research methodology broke stock data into quintiles based on 
firm size.  When all three variables were included in the model regressions, 𝑅2values were .83 or 
higher for all quintiles.  This was a significant improvement on the model using only 2 variables 
(size and book-to-market equity) or 1 variable (market risk), which generated much lower 𝑅2 
values ranging from .04 to .69 (p. 21).   
Fama and French (1996) further defined their three-factor model which they originally 





𝐸(𝑅𝑖) −  𝑅𝑓 =  𝑏𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑀) −  𝑅𝑓]  +  𝑠𝑖𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵) +  ℎ𝑖𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿) 
where SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks (small minus big), HML is the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market 
stocks (high minus low), 𝐸(𝑅𝑀) − 𝑅𝑓, E(SMB), and E(HML) are expected premiums, and the 
factor sensitivities or loadings, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑠𝑖, and ℎ𝑖, are the slopes in the time-series regression. 
Further testing of the three-factor model was conducted by Fama and French (1996), this 
time testing their model directly against the single factor CAPM and finding in part that “many 
of the CAPM average-return anomalies are related, and they are captured by the three-factor 
model” (p. 55).  Empirical support for their model was significant, with 𝑅2 values generally in 
excess of .90.  This was consistent across all deciles, weightings, and other variations in the 
portfolio of stocks evaluated, leading Fama and French (1996) to conclude that their three-factor 
model “captures much of the variation in the cross-section of average stock returns, and it 
absorbs most of the anomalies that have plagued the CAPM” (p. 56). 
Despite the empirical success of the three-factor model, especially as evaluated against 
the CAPM, Fama and French (1996) noted that their three-factor model was problematic in 
capturing the continuation of short-term returns.  They discussed this apparent shortcoming, 
noting that “Asset pricing is irrational.  Investors underreact to short-term past information, 
which produces return continuation, but they overreact to long-term past information, which 
produces return reversal” (p. 81).  In order to address the inherent limitations in their three-factor 
model regarding the continuation of short-term returns, they advocated for future research stating 
that “future work should look for a richer model, perhaps including an additional risk factor, that 





Carhart four-factor model.  Answering the call of Fama and French (1996) to include 
additional risk factors, Carhart (1997) developed a four-factor model that added a factor of 
momentum originally introduced by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model.  Carhart (1997) utilized this four-factor model to study how several 
variables impacted mutual fund performance and found that market factors, expense ratios, and 
other factors, not the skill of mutual fund managers, was the determining factor in persistent 
mutual fund performance.  He further noted that short-term momentum strategies employed by 
some mutual fund firms, as well as the transaction costs associated with this strategy, were 
negatively related to fund performance.   
Carhart (1997) also applied the Sharpe (1964) single factor CAPM and the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model to the same data set of mutual funds and evaluated the 
performance of all three models.  His analysis found that there was no cross-correlation between 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) one-year 
return momentum factor, indicating that multicollinearity was not likely to be present.  This was 
a key finding which supported the assertion that momentum was not already explained by the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and was a good fit for inclusion in the four-factor 
model (Carhart, 1997).  Adjusted 𝑅2 values were also promising, indicating that the four-factor 
model accounted for a significant amount of the variance in mutual fund performance.  When 
analyzing firm performance by decile based on previous calendar year’s return, the four-factor 
model displayed adjusted 𝑅2 values of .887 or higher for all deciles which outperformed the 
adjusted 𝑅2 values for the CAPM in all deciles.  Based on his analysis, Carhart (1997) concluded 
that “the four-factor model eliminates almost all of the patterns in pricing errors, indicating that it 





Due to the improvement in predictive value over the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model has been utilized in numerous event studies, 
including several focused on data breaches.  A contemporary equation of the four-factor model is 
provided by Song et al. (2017): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖1[𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡] + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of stock i on day t, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the relationship for stock i, 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is 
the risk free return on day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on the market portfolio on day t, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the small 
minus big size portfolio return on day t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the high minus low book-to-market portfolio 
return on day t, 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 is the past-one-year winners-minus-losers stock portfolio return on day t, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The current research will utilize all four event study models to evaluate abnormal returns 
related to data breach announcements.  This research design adds originality to the research 
stream, as no previous event study research focused on data breach announcements has 
employed this robust level of analysis.  This approach will also add value to scholars, as it will 
compare the output of the models and provide further data regarding the effectiveness of each 
model in calculating abnormal returns.   
Calculating CAR and CAAR.  In addition to calculating the abnormal return for a 
single security, it is crucial to aggregate these abnormal returns both through the event window 
and across all securities in the data set.  This allows for overall generalizability of the results, as 
well as for a calculation of the variance of abnormal returns, both across securities and across 
time.  These calculations were discussed in detail by MacKinlay (1997), who identified the 









Where the event period begins on day 𝜏1 and ends on day 𝜏2. 
To calculate the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, MacKinlay (1997) offered the following: 
𝜎𝑖
2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  (𝜏2  − 𝜏1 + 1)𝜎𝜀
2  
Where 𝜎𝑖
2is the conditional variance of security i and 𝜎𝜀
2 is the disturbance variance. 
To aggregate abnormal returns both through the event window and across all events in 
the sample, MacKinlay (1997) offers the following: 







Where 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  is the average abnormal return (AAR), N is the number of events, and 𝜏 is the 
event period. 
To calculate the variance of 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝜏, MacKinlay (1997) offered the following: 








To calculate the average of all abnormal returns in the sample, MacKinlay (1997) offers 
the following: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁




Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). 
To calculate the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝜏, MacKinlay (1997) offered the following: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2)) =
1
𝑁








Consistent with MacKinlay (1997) and consistent with the event study methodology, 
CAR and CAAR will be calculated according to these formulas in the current research. 
Tests of significance.  Following the calculation of CAR and CAAR, event studies 
employ various tests to determine the statistical significance of the results.  Some of the most 
often used methodologies for determining statistical significance of abnormal returns are 
discussed by MacKinlay (1997), who offers the following statistical methodology in order to test 
the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2)~𝑁[0, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2))] 
In their analysis of event studies and their use in management research, McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997) reviewed 29 prior event studies and found that there appeared to be general 
shortcomings in the areas of assumptions, research design, and implementation when conducting 
this type of research.  The main issues they cited regarding assumptions, including the length of 
the event window, the possibility of data leakage, and the presence of confounding effects, have 
all been specifically addressed in the design of this research as discussed in detail in previous 
sections.  While there are myriad parametric and non-parametric tests of significance for event 
studies in addition to those put forward by MacKinlay (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997), the following methodologies will be used to calculate the statistical significance of the 
model outputs due to their relative strengths and their availability in www.eventstudytools.com, 
which was the methodology chosen to conduct CAR and CAAR analysis in the current research. 
The Patell’s Z test (Patell, 1976) is a parametric test that has strength in determining the 
manner in which abnormal returns are cumulated across the event window but has limitations 





correlation and event-induced volatility (Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010).  The Patell’s Z test uses the 
following formula to test the null hypothesis of cumulative abnormal returns: 









Where CSAR denotes the cumulative standardized abnormal returns, and S is the forecast-error-
corrected standard deviation. 
To account for the inherent limitations in the Patell’s Z test, the adjusted Patell’s Z test 
was developed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) to account for cross-sectional correlation in the 
data set.  The adjusted Patell’s Z test uses the following formula to test the null hypothesis of 
cumulative abnormal returns: 
𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙  =  𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙√
1
1 + (𝑁 −  1 ) ?̅?
 
Where ?̅? is the average of the sample cross-correlations of the of the estimation period abnormal 
returns.  As this is the more robust test, the adjusted Patell’s Z test will be used as an initial test 
of significance in the current research. 
While the adjusted Patell’s Z test offers advantages over the Patell’s Z test by accounting 
for cross-sectional correlation, it is still susceptible to event induced volatility (Kolari & 
Pynnönen, 2010).  To correct for this potential shortcoming, the standardized cross-sectional test 
will also be applied to test for significance.  Developed by Boehmer et al. (1991), this test 
complements the adjusted Patell’s Z test by including a measure for event-induced volatility, as 
well as accounting for serial correlation within the data set.  However, this test is sensitive to 





standardized cross-sectional test, also known as the BMP test (named after its authors) uses the 
following formula to test the null hypothesis of cumulative abnormal returns: 
𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃  =  √𝑁
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Where 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ represents the average standardized CAR across the N firms in the sample.  
To account for the sensitivity to cross-sectional correlation inherent in the standardized 
cross-sectional test, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) developed the adjusted standardized cross-
sectional test which uses the following formula to test the null hypothesis of cumulative 
abnormal returns: 
𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃  =   𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃√
1 −  ?̅?
1 + (𝑁 − 1)?̅?
 
Where ?̅? is the average of the sample cross-correlations of the of the estimation period abnormal 
returns.  
Consistent with MacKinlay (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997), as well as 
consistent with the significance testing noted in the extant literature, the current research will 
utilize the above significance tests for statistical significance of the abnormal returns output of 
each of the four event study models utilized. 
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
To test the impact to firm valuation of an announced breach of personally identifiable 
information, as well as the timing and content of the firm’s response, a series of regression 
analyses were conducted using several firm and event specific variables.  Using the event study 
methodology as discussed above, abnormal returns (AR) were derived for each day during each 
event window and then aggregated into cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each breach 





of breach, date of breach discovery, breach announcement date, firm industry/ sector, and 
number of records exposed were derived from a data set provided by the Identity Theft Resource 
Center.  Other data points including the content of each firm’s response, such as whether identity 
theft protection or credit monitoring services were provided, was hand collected by the 
researcher using publicly available databases such as Lexis-Nexis.  Dummy variables were used 
to test for potential date clustering, as well as to identify potential confounds such as firm age, 
size, and industry.  Refer to Table 5 for list of all regression variables. 
Table 5 
Summary of Regression Variables 
Symbol Definition Usage 
Year Year of the breach 
announcement. 
Test for potential date clustering and 
to test potential investor distraction 
in 2020 (H4).     
Firm_Size Size of the firm based on market 
cap. 
Test for potential size related 
effects. 
Firm_Age Age of the firm based on IPO 
date. 
Test for potential firm age-related 
effects. 
Industry Industry of the firm based on 
NACS codes. 
Test for potential industry related 
effects. 
#_Records Number of records containing 
nonpublic personal information 
compromised. 
Test for potential effects due to 
breach size. 
Inv_Distract Uses the VIX as a proxy for 
investor distraction by other 
events. 
Test for potential investor 
distraction (H4). 
Gap_Discovered Elapsed time between the 
discovery of a breach and 
announcement by the firm. 
Test whether a delayed 
announcement potentially 
exacerbates negative returns (H2).  
Gap_Occured Elapsed time between when a 
breach occurred and 
announcement by the firm. 
Test whether a delayed 
announcement potentially 
exacerbates negative returns (H2).  
Law_Enf Whether or not the breach 
announcement specifically 
mentioned firm cooperation  
with law enforcement. 
Test whether a firm specific 







Summary of Regression Variables 
Symbol Definition Usage 
Forensic_Inv Whether or not the breach 
announcement specifically 
mentioned coordination with an 
external forensics firm. 
Test whether a firm specific 
response ameliorates negative 
returns (H3a). 
Credit_Mon Whether or not the breach 
announcement specifically 
mentioned offering free  
credit monitoring to affected 
customers. 
Test whether a customer specific 
response ameliorates negative 
returns (H3b). 
ID_Protect Whether or not the breach 
announcement specifically 
mentioned offering ID theft  
protection to affected customers. 
Test whether a customer specific 
response ameliorates negative 
returns (H3b). 
Firm_Resp Aggregates Law_Enf and 
Forensic_Inv. 
Tests the cumulative effectiveness 
of all firm responses in ameliorating 
negative returns (H3b). 
Cust_Resp Aggregates Credit_Mon and 
ID_Protection. 
Tests the cumulative effectiveness 
of all customer specific responses in 
ameliorating negative returns (H3a). 
Note: Certain variables were calculated by the researcher.  Refer to the discussion below for 
details. 
In order to test for potential confounds in the data set, a series of regression analyses were 
conducted using the abnormal returns as identified by each of the four regression models as the 
dependent variable. To test for potential date clustering consistent with Brown (1980), 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997), and MacKinlay (1997) the date of the breach announcement and 
year of announcement dummy variables were regressed against abnormal returns in separate 
regressions.  To test for potential variance in CAR related to firm specific factors, variables for 
firm size (market capitalization), firm age (using initial trading year as a proxy), and industry 





Based on the results of previous research in this area regarding the effect of firm specific 
factors on abnormal returns following a data breach announcement, smaller firms are expected to 
display a more negative stock price reaction to a data breach announcement than larger firms 
consistent with the findings of Cavusoglu et al. (2004) and Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) who 
found that smaller firms were affected more than larger firms.  Industry effects were included as 
a variable in several previous studies, however there were mixed results in the extant literature 
(Kannan et al., 2010; Gatzlaff & McCullough, 2010; Das et al., 2012; Rosati et al., 2017; 
Johnson et al., 2017; Rosati et al., 2019).  As such, while industry effects were included in the 
regression analysis there was no hypothesized relationship between firm type and abnormal 
returns.  Firm age was included as a control variable in the regression analyses in order to assess 
whether data breach announcements disproportionately affect firms based on age, with firm age 
measured as the firm’s initial trading year as noted by FactSet.  As firm age was not included as 
a hypothesized variable in previous research, there is no hypothesized relationship between this 
variable and abnormal returns in the current analysis. 
To test H2, the variables Gap_Discovered and Gap_Occured were calculated in SPSS to 
represent the length of time between when a breach was discovered and when it was reported, 
and the length of time between when a breach occurred and when it was reported, respectively.  
The data points for “date breach discovered” and “date breach occurred” as used in the 
calculations of these variables were provided by the ITRC.  The Gap_Occured variable was 
calculated as the difference between the fields “date of breach” and “date breach/exposure 
reported,” while the Gap_Discovered variable was calculated as the difference between the fields 
“date of discovery” and “date breach/exposure reported.”  These variables were included in the 





breach or the discovery of a breach and the associated breach reporting by the firm leads to an 
increase in negative abnormal returns.  Consistent with H2, it is expected that when including 
these variables in the regression analysis firms that take longer to detect and/or disclose a breach 
will experience more negative abnormal stock price reaction than firms that promptly detect and 
disclose a breach. 
To test H3a and H3b, the variables Law_Enf, Forensic_Inv, Credit_Mon, and ID_Protect 
were hand coded by the researcher and aggregated in SPSS into the variables Firm_Resp and 
Cust_Resp.  The Firm_Resp variable was calculated in SPSS to include the variables Law_Enf 
and Forensic_Inv and was included in regression analyses to test whether breach announcements 
including both types of firm specific responses ameliorate the negative stock price reaction to the 
announcement.  The Cust_Resp variable was calculated in SPSS to include the variables 
ID_Protect and Credit_Mon and was included in regression analyses to test whether firms 
offering both types of customer specific remedies ameliorate the negative stock price reaction to 
the announcement.  Consistent with H3a and H3b, these variables are expected to lessen negative 
abnormal returns such that the presence of a firm or customer specific response in a data breach 
announcement will ameliorate the severity of negative abnormal returns. 
     To test H4, the variable Inv_Distract was included in the regression analysis in order 
to determine whether or not investors are distracted by the impact of other, more significant 
events in the news cycle.  The Inv_Distract variable is a continuous variable derived from the 
CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), which represents market expectations for relative strength near-
term price changes on the S&P 500 (Chen, 2021).  Also known as the ‘fear index,’ the VIX 
measures implied volatility, with higher VIX values noted in times of greater investor 





proxy for investor distraction.  Consistent with H4, a negative correlation is expected between 
investor distraction and abnormal returns, indicating that negative abnormal returns are less 











CHAPTER 4 — RESULTS, DATA ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS 
In order to test the hypothesized main effect in H1, a series of CAAR analyses were 
conducted using www.eventstudytools.com (Schimmer et al., 2015). Consistent with the stated 
methodology, four event windows were evaluated in order to capture abnormal returns as well as 
the speed of the market reaction to data breach announcements.  Each of the event windows was 
centered on the event day (0) in order to capture any pre-announcement data leakage.  Four 
models were run for each stated event period ((-1,1), (-3,3), (-5,5), and (-10,10)) totaling 16 
CAAR analyses.  A review of AAR’s in the moderate and longer-term models found statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns at p<.01 on day (-3) for all models, indicating data leakage 
prior to the breach announcement, consistent with the findings of Campbell et al. (2003), Aytes 
et al. (2006), and Goel and Shawky (2009) in the extant literature, and consistent with the strong 
form test of the efficient markets theory (Fama, 1970).  While this was not directly hypothesized 
in the current research, it is an important finding of note as the extant literature in this area was 
mixed as it pertained to data leakage.   
Additionally, AAR’s were also negative and statistically significant at p<.05 and p<.1 on 
the announcement day, consistent with the semi-strong form test of the efficient markets theory 
(Fama, 1970).  This indicates that investors reacted swiftly and negatively to breach 





that data leakage on event day -3 significantly and negatively affected abnormal returns, which 
was then exacerbated by the market’s negative reaction to the announcement on the 
announcement day.  This negative market reaction continued post-announcement, as investors 
fully digested and responded to new market information, with statistically significant AAR’s 
noted on event days two, three, and five.  Findings regarding potential data leakage and abnormal 
returns on specific event dates have significant impact to both practitioners and scholars, which 
will be discussed later in the Discussion section.  Refer to Table 6 and Table 7 for AAR values in 
the event window (-5,5) for all reported breaches and breaches of PII, respectively.  A summary 
of CAAR output for all 16 models is included as Table 8. 
Table 6  
 
AAR Values for the (-5,5) Event Window- All Reported Breaches 
 
Model Mkt. Adjust Market Fama-French 3 Carhart 4 
-5 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
-4 .001 -.001 -.002 .001 
-3 -.004*** -.005*** -.005*** -.005*** 
-2 .001 -.002 .001 .001 
-1 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
0 -.003* -.002* -.002* -.003* 
1 -.001 >-.000 >-.000 >-.000 
2 -.004** -.004* -.004* -.004 
3 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.001 
4 .004 .004 .004 .004 
5 .004 .005* .005* .005* 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 7  
 
AAR Values for the (-5,5) Event Window- PII Breaches Only 
 
Model Mkt. Adjust Market Fama-French 3 Carhart 4 
-5 >-.000 -.001 >-.000 >-.000 
-4 >-.000 >-.000 .001 >-.000 
-3 -.005*** -.005*** -.005*** -.005*** 
-2 .001 .002 .002 .002 





0 -.003** -.003** -.003* -.003** 
1 >-.000 .001 .001 .001 
2 -.004 -.003 -.003 -.003 
3 -.003** -.002* -.002* -.003** 
4 .004 .005 .005 .005 
5 .004 .005 .005 .005 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 8 
 
CAAR Output for All Models 
 
 All Breach Announcements PII Breach Announcements Only 
Event Window (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) 



















Adjusted Z Score -2.04 -3.13 -2.89 -2.1 -2.18 -2.77 -3.27 -2.03 


































Adjusted Z Score -1.46 -2.28 -1.91 -.92 -1.4 -2.21 -2.17 -.75 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Significance was calculated using a parametric two-tailed adjusted Patell’s Z test with cutoff 
scores of +/- 1.65, 1.96, and 2.58, respectively. 
To test for statistical significance of the CAAR model outputs, a series of tests were 
conducted using the output of the www.eventstudytools.com CAAR analyses (Schimmer et al., 
2015).  An initial significance test was applied to all models using adjusted Patell’s Z scores 
(Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010).  The results of the adjusted Patell’s Z tests noted generally that the 
market adjusted model, while the most simplistic of the four models tested, produced the most 





true for models including all reported data breaches as well as models including only breaches of 
PII.  Adjusted Patell’s Z tests also indicated that both the (-5,5) and (-3,3) event windows 
produced the most consistent statistically significant CAAR results across the four event study 
methodologies, which was also consistent for data sets including all breach announcements as 
well as those limited to exposure of PII.   
Based on the results of the adjusted Patell’s Z tests, additional parametric testing was 
applied to all statistically significant CAAR results.  While www.eventstudytools.com provided 
the results of several parametric tests for each CAAR model output, the standardized cross-
sectional test and the adjusted cross-sectional test were selected due to their relative strengths 
being complimentary to the inherent weakness of the adjusted Patell’s Z test, as detailed in the 
methodology section above.  The application of these additional parametric tests bolstered the 
results of the initial adjusted Patell’s Z testing, noting that the market adjusted model and the (-
5,5) event window produced the most consistent statistically significant results.  Note that while 
initially promising as a result of the adjusted Patell’s Z testing, the (-3,3) event window only 
showed statistically significant results in two of the standardized cross-sectional Z tests and did 
not pass any of the adjusted standardized cross-sectional Z tests. Refer to Table 9 for results of 













 Standardized Cross-Sectional Z Adjusted Standardized  
Cross-Sectional Z 
Event Window (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) 











































PII Breaches Only 
  -1.72 
(*) 











PII Breaches Only 











PII Breaches Only 
      -2.52 
(**) 
 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with 
cutoff scores of +/- 1.65, 1.96, and 2.58, respectively.  
As a result of the parametric tests, the findings of the current research and related 
discussion will focus on the market adjusted model across all event windows as well as the (-5,5) 
event window across all event study methodologies.  While the market adjusted model was the 
most simplistic of the four models tested, recall from the methodology discussion that Brown 
and Warner (1980) noted that “a simple methodology based on the market model performs well 
under a wide variety of conditions.  In some situations, even simpler methods which do not 
explicitly adjust for market wide factors or for risk perform no worse than the market model” (p. 





negative cumulative average abnormal returns across all event windows at p<.05 and in four of 
the eight cases at p<.01.  The CAAR values were also significant, with -.012 noted in the (-3,3) 
window for all breach announcements and -.011 in the (-3,3) window for all announcements 
involving PII only.  These were the most significant CAAR values noted for all breach 
announcements and announcements involving only PII, respectively.  Refer to Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 for a graphical depiction of abnormal returns as they accumulate through the (-5,5) 
event window for all reported breaches and breaches of PII data, respectively. 
Figure 2 
CAAR Output for All Reported Breaches in the (-5,5) Window 
  
Further, when the output of the market adjusted model is viewed across all four event 
windows, it indicates support for the semi-strong form test of the efficient markets theory (Fama, 
1970).  In support of the strong-form test, the abnormal returns are higher in the (-3,3) event 





announcement.  This phenomenon is particularly evident for breaches involving PII data, as the 
market model notes a consistent decline in abnormal negative returns, finding -.011 in the (-3,3) 
window, falling to -.009 over the longer (-5,5) window, and continuing to fall to -.007 in the 
lengthy (-10,10) window.  This is further evidenced via review of the AAR output, as days 2 and 
3 produced statistically significant negative abnormal returns, while abnormal returns turn 
positive on days 4 and 5 and are statistically significant in a few cases.   
Figure 3 
CAAR Output for PII Breaches Only in the (-5,5) Window 
 
While these effect sizes generally appear insignificant in context of social science 
research, they become significant in event study research due to the impact that these seemingly 
insignificant changes on stock price have to a firm.  For example, the average market 
capitalization for all firms included in the CAAR analysis was approximately $71 billion.  If the 





across all event windows is applied to the average market capitalization for all firms included in 
the analysis, it results in a decline of almost $561 million in valuation for the average firm 
included in the sample.  If the same analysis is conducted using the aggregate market 
capitalization of all firms included in the sample (approximately $15.3 trillion), the resulting 
decline in value across all breached firms is significant at approximately $121 billion.  Based on 
an analysis of the CAAR model outputs, with a focus on the market adjusted model due to the 
statistical significance as noted in parametric and non-parametric tests, there is empirical support 
for the main effect hypothesized in H1.  
An evaluation of the event windows noted that the (-5,5) window produced the most 
consistent statistically significant CAAR’s.  However, the predictive power of the market 
adjusted model is also apparent when comparing the output of all four event study methodologies 
in this window.  When model output is evaluated for breach announcements involving exposure 
of PII, there is a significant decline in CAAR from the market adjusted model (-.009) to the 
market model (-.002).  Additionally, while the three and four-factor models produced statistically 
significant results, the abnormal CAAR’s were much smaller at -.001 or less.  This precipitous 
decline in CAAR was also noted for all breach reports, with the market adjusted model reporting 
an abnormal return of -.007 in the (-5,5) window, falling to -.001 for the market model.  While 
the three and four-factor models were significant in the adjusted Patell’s Z tests at p<.1, they did 
not pass the additional parametric tests.  Further, it was noted that the CAAR’s were also 
relatively insignificant for all breaches using both models.  This appears to be consistent with the 
extant literature, as the event study methodologies containing multiple factors tend to produce 
more conservative results.  However, the statistically significant results in the (-5,5) window lend 





While the results of the research and associated discussion have focused on the market 
adjusted model and the (-5,5) window, it should be noted that there were other statistically 
significant CAAR results.  For example, the (-3,3) event window passed all Patell’s Z tests in all 
tested scenarios at p<.05 and for the market adjusted model at p<.01.  Further, this window 
produced negative CAAR’s that were both statistically and economically significant at between -
.006 and -.012.  While the (-3,3) window did not pass parametric tests for the adjusted 
standardized cross-sectional Z in any scenario, the results were significant at p<.1 for the market 
adjusted models for all breach announcements and PII breaches, and the market model for all 
breaches.   
CAAR analysis results were also significant at p<.05 and p<.1 in the three and four-factor 
models in both the (-3,3) and (-5,5) event windows.  Negative CAAR’s in these windows were 
also promising, with values as high as -.007.  However, while all of the models passed Patell’s Z 
tests in    (-3,3) and (-5,5) event windows, none passed additional parametric tests.  As will be 
discussed in detail later, results in other event windows and using multi-factor event study 
methodologies indicated promise and may benefit from future research with a larger data set.  
Prior to constructing regression models to test the remainder of the hypotheses, a 
bivariate correlation analysis was conducted in Microsoft SPSS to identify key correlations 
between variables.  As there were numerous independent and control variables collected in this 
research, an understanding of how these variables correlate with one another was essential at this 
stage to gain insight into how linear regression models may best be constructed to produce 
optimal model fit.   
As a result of the analysis, there were a few correlations of note that tended to provide 





response variable was correlated with CAAR in the market adjusted (-5,5) model.  However, this 
correlation was weak at 𝑟2 =.139.  While this provides limited support for H3b, the correlation 
had a weak effect size and did not correlate with other CAAR output variables.   
For all breaches, both the year of breach (categorical variable) and date breach exposure 
reported (continuous variable) were correlated with the VIX at 𝑟2 =.404 and 𝑟2 =.358, 
respectively, both significant at p<.01.  This correlation was also found for all breach reports 
involving PII at 𝑟2=.385 and 𝑟2=.339, respectively, both p<.01.  This correlation indicates that 
the VIX was higher for more recent breaches, consistent with the underlying rationale for H4 that 
investor distraction was high in 2020 due to COVID and other more dominant news events.   
A negative correlation between the VIX and all of the three-day CAAR model outputs 
was noted, indicating that abnormal negative returns may actually increase in periods of 
increased investor distraction.  The direction of this relationship was opposite of what was 
hypothesized in H4, however this correlation was weak overall at 𝑟2=-.176 for all reported 
breaches and 𝑟2=-.208 for breach announcements involving PII, both significant at p<.05.  The 
VIX was also negatively correlated at p<.05 with the CAAR output of the seven-day market 
adjusted model at 𝑟2=-.188 and 𝑟2=-.214 for all reported breaches and breaches of PII, 
respectively. While there were a few correlations of note as discussed above, there were no 
additional compelling correlations that directly or indirectly supported the hypotheses tested in 
this work.  However, the bivariate correlation review did not identify any correlations that were 
contrary to the hypotheses and were highly correlated based on 𝑟2 values, indicating that the 






In addition to the correlations that directly and indirectly supported the hypotheses, there 
were other correlations noted that may provide insight to the practitioner or serve as the basis for 
additional scholarly research in this area.  For example, for all reported breaches, the year public 
variable correlated with some of the 21-day and 11-day CAAR variables, however weakly with 
an approximate 𝑟2=.140.  This correlation may suggest that investors treat reported breaches at 
newer firms less harshly.  Also, for all reported breaches the customer specific response variable 
was correlated with reporting gap discovered at  𝑟2=.207, indicating that firms that delay 
reporting may be more likely to offer customer specific remedies.  Lastly, the individuals 
impacted variable correlated with reporting gap occurred variable at 𝑟2=.588, indicating that 
breaches with a longer gap in reporting may affect a larger number of customers.  
To test for date clustering, a variable was created in SPSS to capture the year of breach 
announcement and was regressed against the CAAR output for each of the models.  The results 
indicated that there was no date clustering, as there were no statistically significant coefficient 
values associated with breach announcement year noted in any of the regression analyses.  
However, it was noted that either a categorical variable including all breach announcement years 
or a continuous variable including the date of breach announcement did increase the overall 
explanatory power of regression models when included with other variables.  Based on this 
finding, it appeared as though breach year and/or breach date acted as a control variable in the 
overall regression model.  It was further noted that the continuous variable for breach 
announcement date was the more effective control variable for overall model fit, and as such this 
variable was included in the regression models.  
Prior to running focused linear regression models to test the hypotheses put forward in 





which combinations of predictive variables and control variables produced the best overall model 
fit.  Due to the number of variables included in the data set, numerous potential regression 
models were evaluated.  For inclusion in the model, control variables were partially selected 
based on the bivariate correlation analysis as discussed above and were in addition to the 
independent variables specific to test the hypotheses.  As a result of this evaluation, it was noted 
that the following combination of nine independent and control variables produced statistically 
significant regression model output.  Refer to Table 10 for descriptive statistics of all continuous 
variables included in the regression analyses, and Table 11 for descriptive statistics of all 
categorical variables included in the regression analyses.  Additional breakdowns are provided 
for firms by industry and breach announcements by year, which are included as Table 12 and 
Table 13 below. 
Table 10  
 
Descriptive Statistics- Continuous Variables 
 
 All Breach  
Announcements 
PII Breach  
Announcements Only 
Variable n Min. Max. Mean n Min. Max. Mean 
Reporting Gap 
Discovered 
202 0 456 56.68 177 0 282 56.94 
Reporting Gap Occurred 214 0 1793 133.88 187 0 1793 141.59 
VIX 214 9.82 82.69 21.14 187 9.82 82.69 19.89 
LOG Market Cap* 215 16.1 28.51 22.91 187 16.1 28.51 22.91 
Year Public* 217 1874 2018 1990.54 189 1874 2017 1989.03 
Note: “*” denotes a control variable.  The Market Cap variable included extreme values 
which produced significant skewness and kurtosis, with values above 7 and 53, respectively.  
As such, a log value of this variable was created to represent a normal distribution for 
regression analysis. 
Table 11  
 






 All Breach Announcements PII Breach Announcements Only 
Variable n Range Skewness Kurtosis n Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Firm Specific 215 1 1.24 -.46 188 1 1.23 -.49 
Customer 
Specific 
217 1 -.65 -1.59 189 1 -.96 -1.1 
Industry * 217 5 .984 -.63 189 5 -.15 -.41 
Note: “*” denotes a control variable.   
Table 12  
 
Descriptive Statistics: Breach Announcements by Industry Classification 
 




Industrial 137 119 
Utility 8 5 
Transportation 13 11 
Bank 29 24 
Insurance 23 23 
Other Financial 7 7 
Note: n=217 for all breach announcements and n=189 for breaches of PII. 
 
Table 13  
 
Descriptive Statistics: Breach Announcements by Year Reported 
 




2018 70 60 
2019 73 62 
2020 74 67 
Note: n=217 for all breach announcements and n=189 for breaches of PII. 
 
Raw data was collected for firm specific and customer specific responses, including 
offering ID theft protection, offering credit monitoring services, coordination with law 
enforcement, and engaging an independent forensics firm.  However, a review of this raw data 
noted significant multicollinearity.  When included in regression models, these variables 
produced VIF scores in excess of the cutoff value of 10 and as such were excluded from the 





Customer Specific variables, these were substituted in the regression analyses.  Refer to Table 14 
below for descriptive statics of breach response variables. 
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics- Breach Response Variables 
 All Breach 
Announcements 
PII Breach  
Announcements Only 
Variable n % n % 
ID Protect 155 71.42 149 78.83 
Credit Mon. 155 71.42 147 77.77 
Law Enf. 90 41.47 79 41.8 
Forensic Inv. 98 45.16 88 46.56 
Firm Specific 51 23.5 45 23.8 
Customer 
Specific 
142 65.43 135 71.42 
Note: The ID Protect and Credit Mon variables produced VIF values in excess of the cutoff 
score of 10 when used in regression models.  To avoid multicollinearity issues, the Firm 
Specific and Customer Specific variables were substituted. 
Using the independent variables discussed in Table 10 and Table 11, as well as a variable 
for the date of breach reporting, a series of regression analyses were conducted.  Dependent 
variables for each regression model were CAAR outputs that passed parametric testing, as 
identified in Table 9.  Consistent with the previous discussion of CAAR model output, the 
regression analyses focused on the market adjusted model for all event windows and the (-5,5) 
event window for all CAAR model outputs.  The regression analysis results are summarized in 
Table 15 and Table 16 below. 
 
 
Table 15  
 






 All Breach  
Announcements 
PII Breach  
Announcements Only 
Event 
Window (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) 


























>-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 
VIX -.0007 -.0015 
(**) 







.0049 .0028 .0139 .0213 .0062 .0045 .0188 .0343 
Customer 
Specific 
-.0038 .0031 -.0196 -.0193 -.0019 .0089 -.022 -.0254 














-.0016 .0018 -.0034 -.0037 -.0019 .0013 -.0037 -.0036 
Constant -1.65 -4.49 -4.5 -9.04 -1.16 -3.91 -4.24 -8.33 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Regression models also included control variables for firm industry, market capitalization, firm 
age, and breach reporting date.  Model n= 196 for regressions of all breach announcements and 
n= 172 for regressions including only breaches of PII.  
A total of eight regression models were evaluated using market adjusted model CAAR 
outputs as the dependent variable in each model, four testing various event windows including 
all data breach announcements, and four testing various event windows including breach 
announcements of PII.  A review of overall model fit noted statistically significant regression 
output at p<.05 in four of the eight models, with the larger event windows (-5,5) and (-10,10) 
indicating significance for all reported breaches as well as breaches involving PII.  A review of 
the coefficient values and statistical significance of individual variables for each of the 





reporting gap discovered variable had a negative effect on abnormal returns, with coefficient 
values as high as -.0004.  While this coefficient value seems low in context of social science 
research, it is significant when decimalized abnormal returns are the dependent variable in the 
regression model.  For example, a coefficient of -.0004 in this instance indicates that for each 
day a firm delays reporting after the discovery of a breach, the stock price is negatively affected 
by .04%.  Therefore, a breach announcement delayed one standard deviation (63.733 days) in the 
current data set would negatively affect abnormal returns by 2.55%.  Given the average market 
capitalization of all firms in the current data set of $71billion, this would equate to an average 
decrease in stock price of $1.81 billion for firms delaying a breach announcement by an 
additional one standard deviation (63.733 days) from the date of breach discovery.  This provides 
empirical support for H2, as the negative relationship between the gap in breach reporting and 
CAAR indicates that the longer a firm waits to disclose a breach after the discovery of it, the 
more negative investor reaction will be.   
This finding further indicates that there is a more significant market reaction to breach 
announcements involving PII, as the coefficient values for the reporting gap variable were 
slightly higher in these models as compared against modes including all reported breaches.  
However, the delta in coefficient values between the models was negligible at .0001.  While this 
is a very small delta, it may indicate an area for additional research.  Future investigation with a 
larger sample size may produce a more significant delta and shed additional light on how 
investors view breach announcements involving PII compared to all breach announcements in 
general.  
The VIX independent variable also produced statistically significant results at p<.05 in 





p<.1 in the  (-3,3) window for all breach announcements.  Coefficient values were between          
-.0008 and -.0016, however the regression models that produced these coefficients were not 
statistically significant.  This negative relationship between the VIX and abnormal returns is 
contrary to H4, as this indicates that data breach announcements in periods of higher investor 
distraction would actually produce a stronger negative investor reaction.  While this finding that 
the VIX negatively affected abnormal returns appears contrary to H4, there are limitations with 
regard to the overall model fit of the regressions that produced these results as well as contrary 
findings regarding this variable in other regressions models discussed in detail below.   
Eight additional regression models were evaluated using the CAAR values in the (-5,5) 
event window as the dependent variable in each model, four testing each of the CAAR analysis 
methodologies for all data breach announcements, and four testing each of the CAAR analysis 
methodologies for breach announcements of PII.  A review of overall model fit noted statistically 
significant regression output at p<.01 in four of the eight models, consisting of the Fama-French 
three-factor and Carhart four-factor model for all reported breaches as well as breaches involving 
PII.  Model fit was statistically significant at p<.05 for the remaining four models, consisting of 
the market model and market adjusted model for all reported breaches as well as breaches 





Table 16  
 






 All Breach  
Announcements 












         






































>-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 >-.0000 









.0136 .0139 .0227 .0235 .0188 .0188 .0269 .0285 
Customer 
Specific 
-.0187 -.0196 -.0189 -.019 -.0229 -.022 -.0231 -.0233 






















-.0037 -.0061 -.006 
Constant -4.44 -4.5 -5.0 -5.07 -4.26 -4.24 -5.11 -5.35 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regression models also included control variables for firm industry, market capitalization, firm 
age, and breach reporting date. Model n= 196 for regressions of all breach announcements and 
n= 172 for regressions including only breaches of PII. 
A review of the coefficient values and statistical significance of individual model inputs 
for each of the regression models using the CAAR output of the (-5,5) event window as the 
dependent variable noted that the reporting gap discovered variable was significant at p<.1 in all 
eight of the models.  This variable had a negative effect on abnormal returns in all scenarios, 
with effect sizes ranging from -.0002 to -.0003.  Statistical significance and effect sizes of the 
reporting gap discovered variable were largely consistent with the output of the regressions using 





to provide additional support for H2, as statistically significant findings at p<.1 were also noted 
using the output of more robust CAAR models as the dependent variable in the regression 
analysis. 
The VIX variable also produced results significant at p<.1 in the more robust Fama-
French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models, with effect sizes ranging between .0013 and 
.0014.  This effect size equates to a .13% to .14% change in abnormal returns for every single 
point increase in the VIX.  Consistent with the above discussion, these seemingly small effect 
sizes still have a significant impact on abnormal returns.  For example, a one standard deviation 
increase in the VIX (11 points) in the current data set would negatively affect abnormal returns 
by approximately 1.5 %.  Given the average market capitalization of all firms in the current data 
set of $71 billion, this would equate to an average decrease in stock price of $1.06 billion for 
every one standard deviation increase in the VIX.   
The direction of the relationship was positive in these models, which was inconsistent 
with the models using the market adjusted model CAAR output as the dependent variable, and 
consistent with the hypothesized direction of the relationship between these variables as noted in 
H4.  While there is some inconsistency between models based on the dependent variable used in 
the regression analysis, the models indicating that the VIX had a negative effect on CAAR did 
not have statistically significant model fit, while the models that indicated a positive effect on 
CAR were statistically significant.  While the analysis produced mixed results depending on the 
independent variable used, the overall findings tend to support H4.  However, based on the 
inconsistency in the results, further research using a larger sample size is warranted in order to 





With regard to H3a and H3b, there was no empirical support noted in any of the models.  
As such, the null hypothesis is not rejected for either hypothesis.  While there was no empirical 
support for H3a or H3b as a result of the regression analysis, this appeared to be partially 
attributable to the variables used to represent firm specific and customer specific breach 
announcement responses. Due to multicollinearity issues inherent in the individual variables for 
ID theft protection, credit monitoring services, cooperation with law enforcement, and 
engagement of an external forensics firm, these variables could not be included in regression 
analysis as their inclusion produced VIF scores in excess of the cutoff value of ten.  As such, 
firm and customer specific responses could not be tested on a granular level and instead had to 
be included in regression analyses in aggregate by computing firm specific and customer specific 
responses.  While this brought the VIF scores well within the acceptable levels, it limited the 
level of detail regarding the analysis of a specific response to a breach.  Refer to Table 14 for 
descriptive statistics for these variables. 
Proxy variables for firm age (initial trading year) and firm size (market capitalization) 
were included in the regression analyses as controls.  While not hypothesized, the regression 
output for both variables produced statistically significant results which may provide insight into 
investor reactions to data breach announcements.   
The year public variable was statistically significant at p<.05 in two models and 
significant at p<.1 in two additional models using the CAAR output of the market adjusted 
model as the dependent variable in the regression analysis.  Effect sizes were between .0006 and 
.001 in these models.  This was largely consistent with the output of regression models using the 
CAAR values in (-5,5) event window, as the year public variable was significant at p<.1 in seven 





Again, it is noted that these effect sizes remain significant in context of the current research. For 
example, a one standard deviation decrease in year public (22 years, implying that the firm is 22 
years older) in the current data set would negatively affect abnormal returns by approximately 
1.5 %.  Given the average market capitalization of all firms in the current data set of $71 billion, 
this would equate to an average decrease in stock price of $1.06 billion for every one standard 
deviation increase in firm age.  This positive relationship between the variables seems to indicate 
that newer firms are treated less harshly by investors than more established firms.  This may be 
of significant interest to practitioners, which will be detailed in the discussion section below. 
While the market capitalization variable was not statistically significant at p<.05 in any of 
the regression models using the market adjusted model CAAR output as the independent 
variable, it was significant at p<.1 in three of the eight regressions using the (-5,5) window 
CAAR output as the dependent variable, including the more robust Fama-French three-factor and 
Carhart four-factor models.  This variable had a negative effect on abnormal returns, with effect 
sizes at between -.006 and -.0065.  In order to put this effect size in context, a one standard 
deviation increase in the firm’s market capitalization (log value of 2.2) in the current data set 
would negatively affect abnormal returns by approximately 1.4%.  Given the average market 
capitalization of all firms in the current data set of $71 billion, this would equate to an average 
decrease in stock price of $994 million for every one standard deviation increase in a firm’s 
market capitalization.  This negative relationship between the variables seems to indicate that 
larger firms are more affected by negative abnormal returns associated with a breach 
announcement than are smaller firms. This may be of interest to practitioners, as it may assist 





part on the size of the firm.  Further discussion of this non-hypothesized finding will be detailed 
in the discussion section. 
Overall, the results of the CAAR analyses found support for the main effect as 
hypothesized in H1, statistically significant at p<.05.  Results of regression analyses also noted 
support for H2 at the statistically significant p<.05 level, as well as in several additional models 
significant at p<.1.  While there was no empirical support for H3a and H3b in any of the models, 
this may have been due to a multicollinearity issue inherent in the more granular firm specific 
and customer specific responses.  Additional research that addresses the multicollinearity issue 
and allows for regression models including granular breach response variables may be necessary 
in order to further test these related hypotheses.   
There appeared to be partial support for H4 in some of the regression models, significant 
at p<.1, however there were conflicting results in other models suggesting a relationship between 
investor distraction and negative returns opposite the direction hypothesized.  As such, this 
finding also appears to require additional research.  Other non-hypothesized effects on abnormal 
returns, including proxies for firm size and age, also produced results significant at p<.05 and at 
p<.1 in several of the regression models.  While not the focus of the current research, these 












CHAPTER 5 — CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 The current research contributes to the scholarly body of knowledge and provides 
valuable insight to practitioners in several meaningful areas.  As the main effect hypothesized in 
H1 was supported, these results are contrary to the previous assertion by Pirounias et al. (2014) 
that more contemporary breaches are less impactful.  The current research indicates that 
investors continue to evaluate data breaches as a factor impacting firm valuation and act on this 
information.  This is important for the continued study of data breaches, as it provides empirical 
support for the position that investors still react to data breach announcements.  These findings 
will hopefully spur additional investigation into other variables that may affect abnormal returns 
in the wake of a data breach announcement.   
Empirical support for H1 also adds value to practitioners, as firms must be aware of the 
potential short-term erosion to their valuation and proactively select and deploy the appropriate 
countermeasures to mitigate short-term financial risks to the extent possible.  As noted in the 
findings section above, the cumulative average abnormal return of -.79% may initially seem 
insignificant.  However, this seemingly small abnormal return equates to a substantial $561 
million average short-term decrease in firm valuation per data breach announcement in the 
current data set.  With the ability to quantify the potential financial impact of a breach 





present a business case to management for additional internal controls in order to prevent or 
mitigate against the effects of a breach.   
This knowledge may also be employed by firms to address strategic risks, with a clearer 
understanding of how a breach announcement may affect strategy in the short term.  Firms may 
use this knowledge to pursue strategies or engage with vendors or strategic business partners 
based in part on perceived cybersecurity risks, armed with the foresight that a lapse in 
cybersecurity may be accompanied by significant consequences if it manifests itself in a data 
breach.   
Similarly, firms may evaluate their reputational risks in context of these findings.  Using 
negative abnormal returns as a proxy for short term reputational harm, firms may select and right 
size countermeasures to protect and preserve their reputation in the event of a data breach.  Firms 
may also use this information to choose vendors and strategic partners more selectively, as there 
may be shared reputational risks due to a data breach announced by a partner or vendor.  Note 
that breach announcements of vendors were included in the data collection for this research but 
were ultimately not included in the cross-sectional regression models.  Additional research into 
the impact to a firm of a breach announcement caused by a cybersecurity lapse at a vendor may 
be warranted in order to further investigate the possible shared reputational risks between firms, 
vendors, and/or strategic partners.  
Empirical support for H2 adds to the current body of knowledge in this area, bolstering 
previous results by Song et al. (2017).  It also provides valuable insight for firms’ handling of a 
breach in the early stages, and the timing of the breach announcement.  Armed with the 
knowledge that time is of the essence in breach reporting, cybersecurity staff, risk managers, 





impact of a breach by coordinating a timely announcement.  Firms may leverage this knowledge 
to establish policies, procedures, and incident response plans aimed at assuring a timely 
announcement, as well as including data breach scenarios in periodic incident response plan 
testing.  As timely announcements were found to ameliorate negative abnormal returns, firms 
that make timely announcements will benefit from less erosion to their valuation in the short-
term.  
Lack of empirical support for H3a and H3b indicated that a firm’s response had no 
statistically significant effect on abnormal returns.  While there were limitations with regard to 
these variables as discussed in the findings section above, the lack of empirical support for firm 
response appears to underscore the importance of swift reporting.  Specifically, if a firm has to 
decide whether to expediently announce a breach or delay announcement while cooperating with 
law enforcement and external forensic investigators, the totality of the findings in the current 
research suggest that the former choice will have less of a negative impact to the firm. 
Despite the lack of statistical significance of these variables, the direction and effect sizes 
of the firm specific and consumer specific variables were consistent throughout the regression 
analysis.  This may provide some initial insight into how firm and customer-specific responses 
may be viewed by investors.  The regression output consistently provided positive coefficient 
values for firm specific responses, potentially indicating that investors view proactive actions by 
firms such as cooperation with law enforcement or the engagement of an external forensics firm 
favorably.  This may signal that the firm is taking an active role in post-breach remediation, 
which may lead to investor confidence.  Conversely, the coefficient values for customer specific 
responses were consistently negative in the regressions.  This may indicate that when firms offer 





view this negatively as a potential sign of a severe breach.  Investors may also consider the 
firm’s expenditure on ID theft protection and credit monitoring services as a significant negative 
impact to the firm’s potential earnings, in which case they may liquidate their holdings and 
thereby lower the stock price.  These findings, despite their lack of statistical significance in the 
current research, may form the basis for future research in this area.  
Partial support for H4 indicates that investor distraction appears to ameliorate negative 
abnormal returns.  As investors only have finite capability to intake and act upon new 
information, events such as data breach announcements may be overlooked by investors during 
periods where other more significant information is dominant.  For example, events such as 
COVID and a highly contentious political climate in the U.S. appeared to dominate the news 
cycle in 2020 and may have monopolized investors’ attention to the detriment of other events 
such as data breaches.  This finding appears to have significant benefits for future scholarly 
research, as it may extend to all types of firm announcements.  Future research may expand upon 
this finding by evaluating how investor distraction affects myriad other firm news 
announcements.  While not specific to breach announcements, firms may benefit from this 
research by gaining an understanding of how to appropriately time a significant announcement to 
the public.  For example, a firm may delay the announcement of a new product or service during 
periods of high investor distraction, finding it more prudent to delay this information until a time 
where it may be more likely to be viewed and acted upon by investors.   
Findings regarding firm age and size, while not hypothesized in the current research, also 
appear to have significance to both scholars and practitioners alike.  Future scholarly research in 
this area may benefit by focusing on firm specific characteristics as they relate to other 





equally, scholars may expand this area of research into other firm announcements in order to 
determine which types of firms are disproportionately affected by other types of announcements 
and events.  Practitioners may benefit from this knowledge by right sizing their control 
environment based on their firm’s age and size.  For example, larger firms may choose to spend 
comparatively more resources on data breach related countermeasures and/or post-breach 
remedies with the knowledge that they may be treated more harshly by investors than smaller 
firms.  Conversely, more established firms may choose to spend more resources on data breach 
related countermeasures and/or post-breach remedies with the knowledge that they may be 
treated more harshly by investors than newer firms.    
The results of CAAR analyses in event windows of different lengths adds to the current 
body of scholarly knowledge in this area, as the analysis appears to indicate that negative 
abnormal returns are most severe in the moderate term (-3,3) window.  While this phenomenon 
may be specific to the characteristics of the data set used in the current research, it does provide 
insight into the speed at which investors are processing and reacting to new information in 
contemporary markets.  When CAAR outputs for all event windows were viewed in totality, the 
results suggested that one or two days were not enough for investors to fully process and act on 
the information contained in a data breach announcement, but by ten days after the 
announcement the market had fully adjusted.  Scholars may benefit from this information by 
focusing on similar event windows in subsequent event study research, with the knowledge that 
moderate-term windows appear to capture both pre-announcement data leakage consistent with 
the strong form test of the efficient markets theory, and the speed of investor reaction consistent 





The finding of statistically significant abnormal returns in the current research on event 
day (-3) in all CAAR analysis models noted empirical support for the strong form test of the 
efficient markets theory (Fama, 1970), and provided additional support for findings in the extant 
literature of pre-breach announcement leakage (Campbell et al., 2003; Aytes et al., 2006; Goel & 
Shawky, 2009).  This finding contributes to the body of knowledge in this area, as well as 
benefits future scholarly event study research.  Scholars may refer to the data leakage noted in 
the current research as a guide to establish their event windows in such a way to capture any pre-
announcement data leakage if it were to occur.   
This finding is also significant to firms, who may face significant penalties related to 
insider trading by the Securities and Exchange Commission if any misuse of a breach 
announcement or any significant firm announcement was used as the basis for a securities trade 
prior to the official public announcement (SEC, 2018).  Consistent with this finding, firms 
should be aware for the potential for pre-announcement data leakage to occur.  Using this 
knowledge, firms should establish policies and procedures to prevent any pre-announcement 
leakage in order to avoid potential legal or regulatory risk consequences.  This finding also 
somewhat underscores the support for H2, as a firm making a swift breach announcement may 
significantly lessen their exposure to the risks of potential insider trading and/or reputational 
harm that may accompany a delayed announcement. 
While the current research has significant implications for both practitioners and scholars 
alike as discussed above, there were inherent limitations.  These limitations are discussed in 
detail here so that future similar research in this area may be structured in a way to address them 
and contribute to the scholarly body of knowledge by providing more robust results.  The current 





n=99 to n=197 depending on the event window being evaluated.  Overall, sample sizes were 
largely consistent with the research in the extant literature as summarized in Appendix A.  
However, future research with a larger sample size may be appropriate in order to potentially 
replicate these results across a larger data set.   
The current research was also somewhat limited due to the narrow scope of breach years 
being investigated (2018–2020).  While this research utilized the most contemporary data set to 
date, the narrow scope of three years of data points may limit the results to phenomena occurring 
over a short time span and not including an analysis of more long-term trends.  Future research in 
this area using a contemporary data set with a longer scope of breach years may be appropriate in 
order to explore any longitudinal breach announcement related trends occurring over an 
expanded time horizon.   
The current research was narrowly focused on breaches of publicly available information 
(PII) and used a very constricting definition of what type of event constituted a ‘data breach.’  
While the scope of the current research was intentionally narrow due to the perceived limitations 
in the extant literature as discussed in the literature review above, this limits the results to 
breaches including specific characteristics and exposing a specific type of information. 
Additional research may be necessary to widen the scope of the research to provide greater 
generalizability of the results.  
The current research also focused on breaches of firms publicly traded on a U.S. stock 
exchange.  In addition, while there were some foreign firms included in the data set, the great 
majority of firms were U.S. based.  As such, the results appear to only have generalizability 





including non-U.S. firms that are traded on non-U.S. stock exchanges.  This would allow for 
greater generalizability of the results to non-U.S. firms traded in international markets. 
Consistent with the extant literature, the CAAR analysis results were evaluated for 
significance using parametric tests.  However, while the current data set produced CAAR results 
that passed significance testing using the parametric adjusted Patell’s Z, standardized cross-
sectional Z, and adjusted standardized cross-sectional Z tests, the results did not fare as well 
when available non-parametric significance tests were applied.  Additionally, many of the event 
studies in the extant literature applied the Wilcoxson signed-rank test which is a non-parametric 
test that evaluates the direction and magnitude of the abnormal returns (Wilcoxon, 1945).  
However, this significance test was unavailable in the CAAR analysis output of 
www.eventstudytools.com (Schimmer et al., 2015).  In order to address a potential limitation in 
the current research, future similar research may apply both parametric and non-parametric tests 
to identify any skewness or other abnormalities in the CAAR analysis.  
Based in part on inherent limitations in the current research, and in part on potential 
avenues to further the collective body of knowledge in this area, there are several potential areas 
for future research.  Additional independent variables may be collected and included in 
regression analyses to determine what other factors, if any, may lessen post-breach 
announcement impacts to firms.  For example, the current research collected data regarding 
whether a breach included the personal information of the firm’s employees, as well as 
information regarding whether the breach began at a vendor of the firm.  However, neither of 
these variables appeared to warrant inclusion in the regression analyses due to poor overall 





important considerations to investors and should be studied further in context of data breach 
announcements.   
The granularity of breach responses by the firm was admittedly limited in the current 
research and could benefit from further investigation.  Additional research in this area may 
include other types of responses that were not included in the current research.  The current 
research did not include the type of breach as a variable, which may also impact investor 
response and should be studied further.  More granular analysis regarding a firm’s sector and/or 
industry may also be warranted, as the results may provide insight to firms regarding the risk 
environment specific to their sector and/or industry, which could help them craft and right size 
internal controls and breach responses.  In addition to the above suggestions, future research 
should seek to capture any interactions that may give insight to firms in order to assist them in 
right sizing the expenditures on cybersecurity countermeasures and post-breach responses so that 
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Summary of Key Findings 
Author(s) 
# of data 
points Event window(s) Findings 
Garg et al. (2003) 22 (0), (0,2) AR of -2.7% on event day 
(0), CAR -4.5% in the (0,2) 
window. 
Campbell et al. (2003) 43 (1-,1) CAR -5.4% for a sub-sample 
of 11 breaches involving 
confidential data.  
Cavusoglu, Mishra 
Raghunathan (2004) 
66 (0), (0,1) AR of -.86% on event day 
(0), CAR -2.09% in the (0,1) 
window. 
Aytes et al. (2006) 67 (-2, 2)  CAR -1.85% for a sub-
sample of 36 breaches 
involving confidential data.  
Acquisti et al. (2006)  79 Multiple event 
windows during the 
forecast window of 
(-7, 10) 
AR of -.41% on event day 
(0), CAR -.58% over the (0,1) 
window. 
Goel & Shawky (2009) 168 Multiple event 
windows during the 
forecast window of                
(-119, 10) 
AR of -.35 on day (-1) and      
-.48 on day (-2) 
Gatzlaff & McCullough 
(2010)  
77 (0,1) CAR of -.84%  
Andoh-Baidoo et al. (2010) 41 (-1,1) CAR of -3.18%  
Nicholas-Donald, Matus, 
Ryu & Mahmood (2011) 
30 (-1, 1) CAR of -1.5%  






                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Summary of Key Findings 
Author(s) 
# of data 
points Event window(s) Findings 
Yayla & Hu (2011)  123 (-1, 1), (-1,5),         
(-1, 10) 
CAR of -1.6% in the (-1,5) 
window.  
Malhotra & Malhotra 
(2011) 
93 (-1,1), (2,30) CAR of .78% in the (-1,1) 
window and -1.92% in the    
(2, 30) window. 
Modi et al. (2014) 146 (-1, 1), (-2,2) CAR of -1.17% in the             
(-1, 1) window, and                                      
-1.38% in (-2, 2)  
Tanimura & Wehrly (2015) 152 (0,1) CAR of -.23% 
Schatz & Bashroush (2016) 50 (-2, 2) CAR of -2.38% 
Martin et al. (2017)  293 (0), (-1,0), (0,1),      
(-1, 1) 
CAR of -.29% in the (-1,0) 
window, and -.27% in          (-
1,1) 
Rosati et al. (2017)  74 (0,1) CAR of -2.5% 
Song et al.  (2017) 517 (0,1) CAR of -1% 
Johnson et al. (2017) 467 (-1,1) CAR of -.37% 
Lending et al. (2018) 271 (-30, -2), (-1, 1), (0, 
90) 
CAR of –1.4% in the (-1,1) 
window and 1.3% in (0,90)                                
Rosati et al. (2019)  87 (0,1), (0,2), (0,3), 
(4, 10)  
CAR of -1.6% in the (0,1) 
window, -.8% in (0,2),        
1% in (0, 3), and 3.7% in 
(4,10) 
Michel et al. (2020) 344 10 event windows 
over the period       
(-10, 20) 
CAR of -2.96% in the               
(-2,1) window, and -2.85% in 
the (-1,1) window  
 
 
